Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 17

November 2006

Washington's Criminal Competency Laws: Getting From Where We
Are to Where We Should Be
Michael J. Finkle

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj

Recommended Citation
Finkle, Michael J. (2006) "Washington's Criminal Competency Laws: Getting From Where We Are to Where
We Should Be," Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 17.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol5/iss1/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

201

Washington’s Criminal Competency Laws:
Getting From Where We Are
to Where We Should Be
Michael J. Finkle1

The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the
sword—ultimately rests on substantial public confidence in its
moral sanctions.
Felix Frankfurter
In 1997, two high-profile Seattle cases involving mentally ill offenders
brought to the forefront of public attention the interaction between the
criminal justice system and the mental health system. In one case, a
transient, whose minor theft charge had been dismissed one month earlier
because he was not competent to stand trial, stabbed and killed a retired
firefighter.2 In the other, a man who had spent the previous ten years at
Western State Hospital carried an un-sheathed Samurai sword through Pike
Place Market.3 As a result, the King County Executive created a task force
to recommend new legislation to prevent similar future tragedies. In 1998,
the Washington State Legislature, accepting the task force’s
recommendation, enacted Second Substitute Senate Bill 6214 (the Act).
The bill brought forth a sweeping set of changes to Washington’s criminal
competency and civil commitment laws.4 The overwhelming majority of
changes to the competency laws relate to nonfelonies.5
The Act created a system of mandatory mental health treatment to restore
“competency to stand trial” to those defendants charged with nonfelony
crimes. The Act also carried with it the possibility, under certain
circumstances, of mandatory referrals to the civil mental health system. In
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spite of the large number of groups and individuals from the mental health
and criminal justice systems who participated in recommending the
legislation, there was no way to predict how the legislation would work in
practice over the next several years. Two relatively recent cases, Born v.
Thompson6 and Sell v. United States,7 have added yet another layer of
complexity to the nonfelony competency process. Indeed, the competency
process for nonfelonies is far more complex than the competency process
for the most serious felonies. Now that the criminal justice and mental
health systems have eight years of experience with the Act, and in light of
the ever-increasing number of nonfelony cases in which competency is at
issue,8 the time has come to take a hard look at how to improve the
competency process in order to ensure that it continues to serve its intended
purpose.
This article identifies unresolved issues in the current statutory scheme
and the policy implications of each of the issues, including policy choices
inherent in the range of potential “fixes.” Where possible, it proposes
solutions that the legislature could adopt depending upon the policy choices
the legislature makes. Some of the policy implications relate to society’s
choice of referring mentally ill people who commit criminal acts, and are
incompetent to stand trial, to either the criminal competency system or to
the civil commitment system.9 Other policy proposals look at the tension
between the mental health system and the legal system while focusing on
translating mental health concepts into legal standards and determining who
should define many of the legal terms. Still other policy implications relate
to cost-sharing decisions, such as whether a city, county, or the state should
bear the often-unrecognized costs of the criminal competency process.
Section I of the article provides a brief summary of the current
competency framework, from the initial competency evaluation through the
entire process. The next three sections explore the competency framework
in great detail. Section II describes the initial competency evaluation
process and identifies policy issues implicated by that process. Section III
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walks the reader through the complicated process by which the criminal
justice system attempts to render incompetent defendants competent to
proceed in the criminal case, and it discusses the impact of the Sell and
Born cases on that process. It also identifies inefficiencies in the system
and explores how the competency process often overlaps with the process
for civilly committing the mentally ill. Section IV discusses the
competency process in the context of post-judgment cases, and points out
issues specific to cases at the post-judgment phase. Finally, Section V
proposes a series of solutions to the issues identified in the previous
sections. Those solutions provide a consistent competency process that
both utilizes limited resources more effectively and complements the civil
commitment system.

I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMPETENCY PROCESS

A defendant is “incompetent” if he or she lacks the capacity to
understand the nature of the proceedings, or to assist in his or her own
defense as a result of mental disease or defect.10 By the express language
of the statute, there must be a causal connection between the defendant’s
mental disease or defect and the defendant’s lack of capacity.
The competency process begins with the competency evaluation.
Whenever there is reason to doubt a defendant’s competency to stand trial,
the court, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, must order a
competency evaluation.11 The evaluation may occur on an outpatient basis,
i.e., outside of the hospital,12 or it may occur on an inpatient basis at one of
the two state psychiatric hospitals, Western State Hospital (Western State)
or Eastern State Hospital (Eastern State). 13 If the court commits the
defendant to a hospital or other suitable secure public or private mental
health facility for the competency evaluation, then the court has discretion
to delay granting bail until after the defendant has been evaluated and
appears before the court.14 This provision applies equally to felony and
nonfelony defendants. After the evaluation has been completed, the court
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will hold a hearing at which it will make a finding that the defendant is
either competent or incompetent.
If the court finds that the defendant is competent, the criminal
proceedings continue. If the court finds that the defendant is incompetent,
the court’s actions depend upon whether the defendant is charged with a
felony or a nonfelony, and upon whether the case is at the pre-judgment
phase or post-judgment phase. If the case is at the pre-judgment phase, then
all proceedings relating to the defendant’s competency to stand trial are
excluded from the legally prescribed time-for-trial period, beginning on the
date the court orders the competency evaluation.15 The time-for-trial period
begins running again when the court enters a written order finding the
defendant competent.16 A defendant charged with a felony must be ordered
into competency-rendering treatment. Whether a defendant charged with a
nonfelony must be ordered into competency-rendering treatment, and
whether that treatment occurs on an inpatient or outpatient basis, depends
upon a host of factors. If competency-rendering treatment is unsuccessful
for a felony or nonfelony defendant, or if a nonfelony defendant is not
eligible for competency-rendering treatment, the court must dismiss the
matter without prejudice and either release the defendant outright or refer
the defendant for a civil commitment evaluation.17

II.

THE INITIAL COMPETENCY EVALUATION

As noted above, a criminal defendant is incompetent to proceed18 if, as a
result of mental disease or defect, he or she lacks the capacity to understand
the nature of the proceedings or to assist in his or her own defense.19 The
defendant will be presumed competent to stand trial unless the court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is incompetent to
stand trial. The burden to show incompetency rests with the party asserting
it.20 This section describes in further detail the two primary components of
the initial competency assessment: the concept of “mental disease or

PRISON AND DETENTION

Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 205

defect,” and the process by which the initial evaluation occurs. It also
identifies policy choices and who bears the cost of those choices.
A. Defining Mental Disease or Defect
1. No Current Statutory Definition
Though the phrase “mental disease or defect” is of great importance in
RCW 10.77, the legislature has left the phrase undefined. A recent
Washington Supreme Court decision provides some guidance, but it makes
clear that, absent a legislative definition, “mental disease or defect” is
judicially interpreted on a case-by-case basis, subject to an abuse of
discretion standard on appeal. In State v. Klein,21 the defendant challenged
the trial court’s findings that she suffered from a mental disease or defect.
Although Klein involved a petition for full release following an acquittal by
reason of insanity, the insanity statute contains the same “mental disease or
defect” terminology as the incompetency statute, and Klein’s reasoning
should apply equally in the competency context.22
The court held in Klein that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s
finding that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect.23 In
declining to create an across-the-board judicial definition of the term, the
court explained as follows:
Although our legislature has not further defined the term “mental
disease or defect,” other state legislatures have. In doing so, these
legislatures have exercised a legislative prerogative to depart from
a dictionary definition and have instead made policy choices to
exclude specific types of mental conditions from the term. Were
we to do so here by court decision, we would unduly encroach
upon the legislative function, especially since our legislature has
not seen fit to further define the term.24
After Klein, Washington trial courts must now struggle to apply a
standard that contains both legal and mental health components. For
example, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
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Manual of Mental Disorders (4th rev. ed.) (DSM IV) is a widely accepted
compilation of mental disorders and is universally relied upon in the mental
health field. While there might be a tendency to rely on the DSM IV to
define a mental disease or defect in the legal context, “[n]ot all disorders
defined therein will rise to the status of ‘disease or defect’ under our
statutes.”25 For trial judges, the Frye test for scientific testimony,26 as well
as the provisions of Rule 702 of the Washington Rules of Evidence relating
to expert testimony, can assure that the DSM IV does not become a de facto
definition of mental disease or defect. Indeed, the Klein court cautioned
that trial courts should not defer to mental health professionals to define
what are essentially legal terms.27
2. Policy Implications in Defining “Mental Disease or Defect”
Considering that competency determinations begin with the threshold
question of whether the defendant does or does not suffer from a mental
disease or defect, the policy choice is simple: who is best suited to define
what is or is not a mental disease or defect? As the supreme court noted in
Klein, the legislative branch of government has the right of first refusal—it
can choose to adopt a statutory definition or to defer to the judicial branch
to define the term on a case-by-case basis.
Philosophical considerations about the division of governmental powers
aside, a statutory definition is preferable on several levels. First, a uniform
definition ensures that trial judges in Puyallup and Pullman apply the same
definition as trial judges in Seattle and Selah. Furthermore, the legislature
can exercise quality control in adopting a definition by obtaining input from
mental health experts, legal experts, and the general public, and can then
give appropriate consideration and weight to that input. A judicial or caseby-case interpretation, on the other hand, leaves the quality of the trial
judge’s decision dependent upon clinical information and the quality of the
expert opinion(s) available in a particular case.
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B. Determining the True Purpose of the Evaluation Process
Legislation generally involves choosing from among several alternatives,
each of which has an associated fiscal and/or societal cost. In the case of
Washington’s current competency laws, one of the crucial choices the state
must make concerns the manner in which it responds to the continuously
escalating amount of bed space needed for patients at both Western State
and Eastern State. The defendant certainly pays a liberty cost when his or
her freedom is curtailed so that the hospital can conduct a competency
evaluation. The longer it takes for the evaluation, the greater the
defendant’s freedom is curtailed. Society also pays an escalating cost based
upon the length of time it takes for the evaluation to occur.28 The former
cost is of great consequence to specific individuals, while the latter is of
great consequence to the public at large.
For defendants who are in custody at the time the court orders a
competency evaluation, the court may order that the examination occur
inpatient at a mental health facility or, with the agreement of the parties, in
jail.29 The relevant statutory language is:
For purposes of the examination, the court may order the defendant
committed to a hospital or other suitably secure public or private
mental health facility for a period of time necessary to complete
the examination, but not to exceed fifteen days from the time of
admission to the facility. If the defendant is being held in jail or
other detention facility, upon agreement of the parties, the court
may direct that the examination be conducted at the jail or other
detention facility.30
The statute is subject to interpretation regarding whether there is a time
limit within which an in-jail evaluation must occur.31 The legislature should
clear up this ambiguity when it amends other provisions of the competency
statutes.
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1. A System Ready to Collapse From its Own Weight
While the competency evaluation process currently in place may have
been sufficient to handle the caseload of ten years ago, it is most certainly
overwhelmed by today’s caseload. Statistics provided by the Department of
Social and Health Services (DSHS) to the legislature in June 2006 show a
“steep and steady rise” in the number of competency evaluations conducted
over the past ten years.32 In 1995, Western State and Eastern State
conducted a combined total of 665 competency evaluations, 21 percent
(140) of which were for nonfelony cases. By 2005, the number of
evaluations had tripled to 1,995, and the percentage pertaining to nonfelony
cases had nearly doubled to 40 percent (802). Astonishingly, the percentage
of nonfelony evaluations by Eastern State actually decreased from 26
percent to 25 percent, while the percentage of nonfelony evaluations at
Western State tripled from 19 percent to 56 percent.33 Statistics available
for Western State show that the percentage of outpatient evaluations
increased by orders of magnitude over that same ten year period—from 4.3
percent in 1995 to 82 percent in 2005.34 The overwhelming majority of
outpatient evaluations occur in jail.35 Consequently, the average outpatient
evaluation by Western State currently takes twenty-one days to complete
for in-jail nonfelony defendants, thirty to sixty days for in-jail felony
defendants, and four months for out-of-custody evaluations.36 Although
inpatient evaluations must occur within fifteen days of the defendant’s
admission to the hospital, 37 defendants spend an average of forty to sixty
days in jail waiting to be admitted to Western State. 38
The lengthy wait for evaluations is most likely attributable to three
factors: (1) staffing levels at Western and Eastern State; (2) limited bed
space in the hospitals themselves; and (3) at least for Western State, the
terms of a federal court order limiting admissions to the hospital based on
several factors including available bed space.39 First, while Western State’s
staffing levels have increased, which helps ease the strain on conducting
outpatient evaluations without increasing the hospital’s physical plant, there
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are limits to the number of qualified competency evaluators that the hospital
can train and for whom it can provide office space. Secondly, concerning
bed space, the hospital serves the needs of many other mentally ill people,
including those who are undergoing competency-rendering treatment,
treatment pursuant to an acquittal by reason of insanity, or treatment
pursuant to civil commitment.40 Finally, unless the state increases Western
State’s physical campus, it cannot increase available bed space for inpatient
evaluations without also decreasing available bed space for other purposes.
2. Determining and Allocating the Cost
The state bears the monetary cost of the evaluation and, if the defendant
is evaluated on an inpatient basis, the costs of the defendant’s hospital stay
during the course of the evaluation. Cities and counties bear the monetary
cost for the amount of time the defendant spends in jail—either awaiting
transport to the hospital for an inpatient evaluation or for an outpatient
evaluation to occur in the jail.41 As the length of time a defendant spends in
jail for competency evaluation purposes increases, so does the cost to cities
and counties. If jail costs have increased because of staffing or capacity
issues at the two state-run psychiatric hospitals, then the state has
essentially shifted a large portion of the cost of competency evaluations to
local jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions then have less money to spend on
social services for all of their citizens, some of whom are mentally ill. As
social services for the mentally ill decrease, the number of mentally ill
people who commit acts that result in criminal charges presumably
increases. That, in turn, leads to further increases in competency
evaluations, and the vicious cycle renews itself.
By the same token, using state funds to increase capacity at Western State
and Eastern State reduces the amount of funding available for other social
services, including social services designated for the mentally ill. The less
the state spends on social services, the more likely those who would
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otherwise benefit from these social services will either go without or have
to depend on local jurisdictions for support.

III.

THE COMPETENCY-RENDERING PROCESS

The logical next step, if the court finds the defendant incompetent to
stand trial, is to try to restore the defendant’s competency. The current
statutory process requires far more resources than necessary—to the point
where the nonfelony process far exceeds the felony process in its
complexity. This section describes the current competency-rendering
process42 for defendants charged with felonies and for those charged with
nonfelonies,43 identifying aspects of each of those processes that are either
difficult to apply, inefficient, or both. It also examines the concept of
involuntary medication to render a defendant competent, and the interaction
between the competency-rendering process and involuntary medication.
A. The Felony Process
If the court finds a felony defendant incompetent to stand trial, the
process is relatively straightforward: the court must commit the defendant
to DSHS for up to ninety days of competency-rendering treatment.44 If the
defendant remains incompetent at the end of ninety days, the court has the
discretion to order an additional ninety days of treatment.45 If the defendant
still remains incompetent at the end of the second ninety-day period, and if
certain conditions are met, the court may extend the treatment by up to an
additional 180 days.46 To extend treatment, the court or jury47 must find
that the defendant is a substantial danger to other persons or presents a
substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety
or security48 and that there is a substantial likelihood the defendant will be
rendered competent within a reasonable period.49
If the defendant remains incompetent to stand trial at the end of the final
competency-rendering period, the court must dismiss the case without
prejudice—which allows a prosecutor to refile the case at a later time—and
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either institute civil commitment proceedings or order the defendant’s
release.50 Unlike the nonfelony process, in which the civil commitment
referral procedures are clearly set forth,51 the felony process is silent on the
referral procedures.
B. The Nonfelony Process
With legislative passage of the Act in 1998, the legislature began treating
nonfelony defendants more like felony defendants by creating a
competency-rendering process for eligible cases. The similarities end there;
the nonfelony competency-rendering process is more complex than the
felony process by orders of magnitude. The nonfelony court must
determine whether the defendant is treatment-eligible, and, if eligible, the
court must decide what form the competency-rendering treatment should
take. As this next section graphically illustrates, what sounds like a simple
determination actually takes up an inordinate amount of court and attorney
resources.
1. Identifying Treatment-Eligible Nonfelony Defendants—“Violent
Qualifiers”
Washington’s criminal competency statute, codified as RCW
10.77.090(1)(d), is silent about the prosecution’s burden of proof, but the
Washington State Supreme Court held in Born52 that the prosecution must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that a nonfelony defendant is
eligible for competency-rendering treatment. The elevated burden of proof,
coupled with the procedural hoops set forth in the statute, leads to a large
number of hearings just on the issue of whether a nonfelony defendant is
treatment-eligible.
A “treatment-eligible nonfelony defendant” is one who: (1) has a history
of, or a pending charge of, one or more violent acts; or (2) has previously
been acquitted by reason of insanity, or has previously been found
incompetent, with regard to an alleged offense involving actual, threatened,
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or attempted physical harm to a person.53 A “violent act” is behavior that
(1) resulted in, or if completed as intended would have resulted in, or was
threatened to be carried out by a person who had the intent and opportunity
to carry out the threat and would have resulted in homicide, nonfatal
injuries, or substantial damage to property; or (2) recklessly creates an
immediate risk of serious physical injury to another person.54 For purposes
of defining a violent act, “nonfatal injuries” means physical pain or injury,
illness, or an impairment of physical condition.55 A “history of one or more
violent acts” means violent acts committed by the defendant within the ten
years prior to the date criminal charges were filed—excluding any time
spent in jail, prison, or a mental health facility.56
a) Violent Acts
A violent act under the statute does not require a conviction; the
definition of “violent act” refers to “behavior” rather than a conviction.
This makes sense, especially in the context of a pending charge, which by
definition will not involve a conviction. Since the “clear and convincing”
standard of proof for competency-rendering treatment eligibility is less than
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof for a criminal
conviction, it is possible for a court to find a violent act even if the
defendant has been acquitted in the criminal case. Additionally, there are
cases in which a violent act can be established other than by a conviction or
a pending charge. For example, the competency evaluation report itself
might refer to a past violent act by the defendant against staff members at
the evaluation facility.
b) History of One or More Violent Acts
The most common form of “history” of one or more violent acts in
determining treatment-eligible or non-treatment-eligible status will be a
prior conviction. But how does the prosecution establish that the prior
conviction involved a violent act?
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(1) Statutory Presumptions
RCW 10.77.260 established several statutory presumptions to guide the
courts. The presumptions are rebuttable. First, the court must presume that
a past conviction, whether by guilty plea or finding, establishes the elements
necessary for the crime charged.
Second, the court must also consider that the elements of the crime, in the
absence of the facts of a specific case, may not be sufficient to establish that
the defendant committed a violent act. For example, assault can be
committed in several ways, including an unlawful and offensive touching
which neither caused nor threatened to cause injury. In order to use the
assault to find that the defendant is in the treatment-eligible category, the
court would need to know more about the underlying facts.
Third, the court must presume that the facts underlying the elements of
the crime, if un-rebutted, are sufficient to establish that the defendant
committed a violent act. That begs this question: what constitutes rebuttal?
Does rebuttal include a defense argument based on the very same facts
relied upon by the prosecution? If a defense argument does constitute
rebuttal, the court has deference in deciding any weight given to the
rebuttal. The clear intent of the legislature in the 1998 amendments to
RCW 10.77.260 was to expand on the court’s ability to receive information
on which it can make a reasonable and intelligent finding regarding whether
the defendant is treatment-eligible or non-treatment-eligible. But the
legislature also clearly intended that the court analyze the facts underlying
the alleged violent act in making its decision.57
(2) Acceptable Evidence
RCW 10.77.260(3) provides that, in determining the underlying facts, the
court may consider information including, but not limited to, affidavits or
declarations under penalty of perjury, criminal history record information,58
and its own or certified copies of another court’s records. Examples of
court records referred to by the statute are criminal complaints,
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certifications of probable cause to detain, dockets, and orders on judgment
and sentencing.
Note that the statute does not expressly include or exclude police reports.
One could argue that the statute’s language “including, but not limited to”
was intended by the legislature to mean that the court could choose to
accept material that is not expressly listed in the statute, such as a police
report. It is left to each court, then, to interpret the meaning of the statute
and to decide whether to accept police reports as evidence at the hearing. In
addition, if the police report is signed under penalty of perjury under the
laws of the State of Washington, one could argue that the police report
meets the statutory definition of a “declaration.”59
There is one additional caveat. As noted above, the supreme court held
in Born that the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that a nonfelony defendant is eligible for competency-rendering treatment.
There may be other issues, such as determining the appropriate level of due
process at a competency-rendering hearing. Depending on how much
process is required, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Crawford v.
Washington60 may come into play. In Crawford, the Court held that where
those “testimonial” statements that fall within certain types of hearsay
exceptions are at issue, the confrontation clause of the U.S. Constitution
requires a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses. The extent to which
Crawford would apply, if at all, to a competency-rendering hearing
involving RCW 10.77.260(3) is yet another issue complicating the process.
(3) How Provisions Apply in Practice
Two brief examples demonstrate how the statute works in practice. For
each example, assume that the defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree assault
two years ago, and that the prosecution presented a certified copy of the
order on judgment and sentencing, as well as a certified copy of the
certification of probable cause filed along with the original charge. Assume
further that there is no Crawford issue.61
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In the first example, the certification of probable cause recites that the
defendant told the victim, “I want to break your neck,” hit the victim on the
back of the head with a two-foot-long wooden board, and yelled, “I hope
you feel the pain.” This presents a clear example of a past violent act. It is
hard to imagine any facts in the certification of probable cause on which the
defense could rely to rebut the presumption that the assault constituted a
violent act. The only way the defense could rebut the underlying facts is by
presenting witnesses to the prior incident.62
In the second example, the certification of probable cause recites that the
defendant walked up to the victim and slapped him on the cheek, but that
the victim was not injured. In this example, the court would be required to
presume that all of the elements of assault were established by the plea. But
the court would also need to consider that the plea could have been based
on either a theory of offensive touching or a theory of attempt to injure.
The first theory would not establish a violent act, but the second might.
The prosecution would argue that the facts establish the violent act, since
the defendant intentionally hit the victim. The defense could argue that the
facts in the certification of probable cause do not amount to a violent act, as
defined under RCW 10.77.010(23), because they show, at most, an
offensive touching. Since the defense’s argument appears plausible under
the facts of the example, the prosecution’s version of the facts would be
rebutted. The court would need to make a factual finding about whether the
prior assault constituted a violent act. In this cheek-slapping example,
depending on any other surrounding facts in the certification of probable
cause, the court could reasonably find for either the prosecution or the
defense.
There is one additional point well worth considering. The definition of
“violent act” also includes behavior that “recklessly creates an immediate
risk of serious physical injury to another person.”63 If the defendant’s
behavior in the alleged violent act was not intentional and did not result in
actual nonfatal injuries, it may be possible to use the so-called reckless
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prong of the definition of “violent act.” Consider a DUI or reckless driving
case in which the defendant’s driving was especially egregious, such as
driving up on a sidewalk or hitting a pedestrian without causing enough
injury to justify a felony vehicular assault charge.
c) Pending Charge Involving Violent Act
The presumptions in RCW 10.77.260 do not apply to pending charges.
For a pending charge, the simplest procedure is for the court to refer to the
police report or certification of probable cause to see if the facts contained
therein support a finding that the defendant belongs in the treatment-eligible
category. For example, the parties in Born stipulated to the police report.
It is possible that the defense will decline to stipulate and will argue that
due process requires that the prosecution present live testimony because the
defendant faces possible competency-rendering treatment. Three aspects of
the supreme court’s holding in Born might make it difficult to convince a
trial court otherwise. First, the court held that the proper standard for
determining a defendant’s eligibility for competency-rendering treatment is
by clear and convincing evidence. Second, the court stated that the
prosecution had a lesser interest in prosecuting nonfelonies than felonies.64
Third, the court relied on the due process rights in civil commitment cases,
which require greater process.65
A contrary prosecution argument is that by setting bail and detaining
criminal defendants in custody pending trial, courts are permitted to rely on
facts contained in a document sworn under penalty of perjury, such as a
police report or the certification of probable cause. Detaining a person on
bail and detaining a person for competency-rendering treatment appear to
involve the same type of liberty deprivation, so one could argue that there is
no reason to rely on a sworn police report for one but not for the other.
Also, there is no process provided for felony defendants; any defendant
charged with a felony who is incompetent must be sent for up to ninety days
of competency-rendering treatment.66 The bottom line, however, is that the
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court must make the requisite findings, and has the authority to require live
testimony even if the constitution does not require it. Given the supreme
court’s position in Born, the safer course of action, absent a stipulation, is to
present live testimony.
d) Prior Incompetency Dismissals and Insanity Acquittals
It is axiomatic that the prosecutor, in order to rely on a prior
incompetency dismissal or insanity acquittal, must be aware that it has
occurred. That awareness cannot exist unless there is a record of the
dismissal or acquittal. The Criminal Records Privacy Act’s definition of
“conviction or other disposition adverse to the subject” includes dismissals
due to incompetency and acquittals by reason of insanity,67 so the dismissal
or acquittal can be entered into a defendant’s criminal history.
Unfortunately, many prior findings of incompetency or insanity, especially
those from courts of limited jurisdiction, are not identifiable on criminal
histories, so these two criteria may not be applied consistently. In some
cases, Eastern State or Western State may have limited data available about
a particular defendant who is being evaluated.
Assuming the defendant does have a prior incompetency dismissal or
insanity acquittal, the question is how to establish that it involved a violent
act. The procedures in RCW 10.77.260 do not apply to prior incompetency
dismissals; the discussion of pending charges above would presumably
apply. Since an insanity acquittal includes a finding that the defendant
committed the acts charged,68 the procedures in RCW 10.77.260 for prior
convictions presumably apply to prior insanity acquittals.
e) When to Make the Determination
The issue of whether a nonfelony defendant is in the treatment-eligible or
non-treatment-eligible category does not arise until after the court has
determined that the defendant is incompetent. Once the court makes that
determination, the court will need to set another hearing date, this time to
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handle the issue of whether the defendant is in the treatment-eligible or nontreatment-eligible category. Depending on the timing of the initial
competency evaluation and the willingness of the parties to stipulate to
some or all of the issues, the court might set a single hearing for
competency and for treatment-eligible/non-treatment-eligible status, or a
separate hearing for each issue.
2. Different Results for Treatment-Eligible and Non-TreatmentEligible Nonfelony Defendants
a) Competency-Rendering Treatment for Treatment-Eligible Nonfelony
Defendants
So why does it matter whether a nonfelony defendant is eligible for
competency-rendering treatment?
A treatment-eligible nonfelony
defendant, if found incompetent, must be placed into inpatient or outpatient
treatment to restore competency. The court has discretion to require
fourteen days of inpatient treatment or to require ninety days of outpatient
treatment by way of a conditional release, or to require a combination of the
two.69 The treatment alternatives need not be done in any particular order,
but as a practical matter there is no formal outpatient treatment program
available, at least through Western State.70 There has been some
preliminary talk about setting up an outpatient competency-rendering
treatment program through Western State, but that has yet to happen.
Even if outpatient competency-rendering were readily available, it might
not make sense for the prosecutor to recommend, or for the court to order,
that the defendant undertake such a program. For example, the defendant
might have a sufficiently violent proclivity (based on criminal history or the
current charge) that he or she would be dangerous to patients and staff at an
unsecured outpatient treatment facility. Another consideration is if the
symptoms of the defendant’s mental illness are active and severe. The
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prosecutor and court should be concerned about the defendant’s ability to
participate in the program and to get to and from an outpatient program.71
However, there may be circumstances where outpatient competencyrendering treatment is appropriate. For example, assume the defendant has
successfully been receiving services through the civil commitment process72
on a ninety-day Less Restrictive Order (LRO).73 If there are no
dangerousness issues and the defendant is appropriately out of custody on
the criminal matter, it may be possible for Western State or Eastern State to
utilize the LRO program as both the LRO and the outpatient competencyrendering treatment programs.74
There is one exception to the mandatory treatment requirement. If at any
time during the proceeding the court finds that the defendant is not likely to
be rendered competent within the applicable statutory competencyrendering treatment period, the court skips or stops the competencyrendering process. The case proceeds in the same manner as if the
competency-rendering treatment was unsuccessful.75 If, in the opinion of a
professional person,76 the defendant is rendered competent, the defendant
must be returned to court for a hearing. If the court determines at that
hearing that competency has been restored, the stay of proceedings must be
lifted and the case will proceed.77 The court must take care to comply with
RCW 10.77.065, to the extent it applies.78
(1) Extending Length of Inpatient CompetencyRenderingTreatment
Beyond Fourteen Days
The fourteen-day period for inpatient competency-rendering treatment
includes only the time the defendant is actually at the treatment facility, and
is in addition to reasonable time for transport to or from the facility. Also,
bear in mind that the fourteen-day inpatient period is “in addition to any
unused time of the [competency] evaluation under RCW 10.77.060.”79 The
relevant portion of RCW 10.77.060 relating to the “time” of the competency
evaluation reads as follows:
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For purposes of the examination, the court may order the defendant
committed to a hospital or other suitably secure public or private
mental health facility for a period of time necessary to complete
the examination, but not to exceed fifteen days from the time of
admission to the facility. If the defendant is being held in jail or
other detention facility, upon agreement of the parties, the court
may direct that the examination be conducted at the jail or other
detention facility.80 (emphasis added)
The statute contains a fifteen-day time limit for evaluations at a hospital
or other secure mental health facility, but contains no such time limit for an
in-jail evaluation.81 The only way time spent awaiting an in-jail evaluation
could count against the “unused time of the evaluation” is if the court
considers a jail equivalent to a “hospital or other suitably secure public or
private mental health facility.”
How does one calculate the unused time for the competency evaluation in
order to determine the total inpatient time available? For evaluations
conducted at Western State or Eastern State, the calculation is
straightforward. If the defendant stays at the hospital for the full fifteen
days allowed under RCW 10.77.060(1)(a), there is no unused time to add,
and the competency-rendering period would be fourteen days. If the
defendant stays at the hospital for only twelve days, then the unused time
would be three days, for a competency-rendering treatment period of
seventeen days.
For evaluations conducted in the jail, the calculation should be just as
straightforward. For example, assume that on day one, a treatment-eligible
nonfelony defendant is arraigned in custody and presents a competency
issue. The court issues an order for an evaluation that same day. Assume
further that Western State conducts the evaluation in the jail and that the
next hearing date is seven days from the arraignment. How many days of
“unused time of the evaluation” remain? Recent legislation and case law
support an interpretation that the “unused time of the evaluation under
RCW 10.77.060” in this example would be fifteen days, because the
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evaluation did not occur in the hospital, which translates to twenty-nine
days of inpatient competency-rendering treatment.
The 2004 amendment to RCW 10.77.060 and the Washington Court of
Appeals opinion in Weiss v. Thompson,82 supports such an interpretation of
RCW 10.77.060 and 10.77.090. Currently, RCW 10.77.060(1)(a) requires
the parties’ approval for an in-jail evaluation. If a jail were truly equivalent
to a hospital or other secure mental health facility, the court would not need
the parties’ permission to order that the evaluation occur in the jail. The
court would already have had that authority under the prior version of the
statute, and thus the 2004 amendment would be unnecessary.83 And in
Weiss, a pre-amendment case, Division One held that time spent in jail
awaiting transport to Western State for competency-rendering treatment did
not qualify as placement in a secure mental health facility for purposes of
RCW 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C)(I).84 However, the phrase “secure mental
health facility” is sufficiently similar to the phrase “hospital or suitably
secure public or private mental health facility,” as used in RCW
10.77.060(1)(a), to justify a court giving it a similar interpretation. Though
Weiss predates the 2004 amendment to RCW 10.77.060, its reasoning is
sound, and the supreme court denied review.85 Therefore, Weiss remains
good law unless and until a conflicting case comes out of the court of
appeals.
(2) Outpatient Competency-Rendering Treatment
If the defendant remains incompetent after the inpatient competencyrendering treatment, the court may order up to ninety days of outpatient
competency-rendering treatment. Outpatient treatment can only occur if the
defendant is out of custody—the treatment providers are not able to provide
treatment to a jail inmate. If a defendant is unsuitable for outpatient
competency-rendering treatment, e.g., because he or she is far too
dangerous, the court will need to balance the potential benefits of outpatient
competency-rendering treatment with the public-safety risks of releasing the
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defendant from custody into outpatient treatment. The court has two
options.
It could order outpatient competency-rendering treatment
following the unsuccessful inpatient treatment. Alternatively, if the
defendant is in custody, the court could dismiss the case and refer him or
her to an evaluation and treatment facility for evaluation for possible civil
commitment under RCW 71.05.86
This discussion assumes that outpatient competency-rendering treatment
is available. That is not necessarily an accurate assumption, as noted
previously. The statute states that for outpatient competency-rendering
treatment, DSHS will place the defendant on conditional release.87 It
therefore appears to be the responsibility of DSHS to secure the treatment,
though the court issues the treatment order. To date DSHS has not
contracted with local providers to provide such treatment, but Western State
has advised the author that DSHS would make such treatment available if
ordered.88 For that reason, the model orders direct Western State or Eastern
State to provide the name(s) of the appropriate facility(ies). However, that
does not answer the question of what will happen if a court orders a
defendant into outpatient competency-rendering treatment.
The statute makes no clear provision for a court’s alternatives if a
defendant violates the terms of outpatient treatment. If the defendant is still
reasonably likely to be rendered competent with the treatment, the court
might decide to order the defendant back into the treatment program. If the
nature of the violation makes it likely that the defendant would not or could
not comply with the treatment, then the court could find, based on the
violation, that the defendant is unlikely to be rendered competent with
further treatment. The case would proceed in the same manner as if
inpatient treatment was unlikely to restore the defendant’s competency.89 If
the defendant had not previously been ordered into inpatient treatment, the
court could consider inpatient treatment as an option.90
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(3) Medication as Part of Treatment
The primary component of competency-rendering treatment is
psychotropic medication. In many instances the defendant will voluntarily
take medication prescribed as part of the competency-rendering treatment.
But in a large number of cases the defendant is likely to refuse to take
medication voluntarily, and indeed may have a history of refusing to take
such medication. In that circumstance, the prosecution will want to obtain
court authority for the treatment agency to administer involuntary
medication as part of the treatment.
Case law sets out the conditions under which the court may authorize
involuntary medication as part of competency-rendering treatment. By
holding an evidentiary hearing, the court determines whether those
conditions are met. The hearing can be held at the same time as the hearing
that determines whether the defendant is in the treatment-eligible or nontreatment-eligible category. The prosecution must present live testimony by
a psychiatrist from the treatment facility, unless all parties are willing to
take testimony by telephone.
In Sell v. United States,91 the U. S. Supreme Court set out the
constitutional parameters of a court’s authority to authorize the
administration of involuntary medication as part of competency-rendering
treatment. The complexity and importance of the issue of involuntary
medication, as it relates to competency-rendering treatment, necessitates the
detailed discussion contained in a later portion of this article.92
b) Unsuccessful Competency-Rendering Treatment (or Treatment Unlikely
to Succeed) for Treatment-Eligible Nonfelony Defendants
If the competency-rendering treatment is unsuccessful, or if the evaluator
opines that treatment is unlikely to succeed, the court must dismiss the case
without prejudice.93 What happens after that depends on the defendant’s
custody status at the time of the dismissal.94

VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • 2006

224 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

(1) In-Custody Defendants
If the defendant is in custody at the time of dismissal, which as a practical
matter means that the defendant’s inpatient treatment did not succeed, then
the defendant must be detained and sent to an evaluation and treatment
facility for up to seventy-two hours for a civil commitment evaluation.95
The seventy-two-hour period begins to run on the next nonholiday weekday
following the court order, and runs “to the end of the last nonholiday
weekday within the seventy-two hour period.”96 For example, if the court
order is issued on a Monday, the seventy-two-hour period begins on
Tuesday and ends on Thursday.97 The same process applies if (1) the
defendant is in custody, (2) the court finds that the defendant is not likely to
regain competency, and (3) the defendant either skipped or discontinued
competency-rendering treatment as required by statute.98
The key question is this: to which evaluation and treatment facility
should the defendant be sent? The answer is somewhat complicated and
affects more than just the decision of where to transport the defendant. The
issue, also, is one of cost allocation between the state and the county.99
If the detention was considered a proceeding under RCW 10.77, then the
state would be responsible for the cost of the detention, and the proper
location for the detention would be Western State or Eastern State,
depending on the details of the case. The Attorney General’s Office would
handle the commitment procedures from that point. But if the detention
was considered a proceeding under RCW 71.05, then the county would be
responsible for the cost of the detention, and the proper location would be a
local evaluation and treatment facility unless the county contracted with
Western State or Eastern State for the services. The county prosecutor
would handle the commitment proceedings from that point.100
(2) Out-of-Custody Defendants
If the defendant is referred for civil commitment evaluation while on
conditional release in the criminal case, which as a practical matter means
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that the defendant’s outpatient treatment did not succeed, then the
evaluation will occur at any location chosen by a statutorily required
designated mental health professional (DMHP).101 That evaluation must
occur within forty-eight hours of the referral.102 Unfortunately, the statute
does not provide a remedy if the defendant fails to appear for the civil
commitment evaluation, nor does it specify whether the remedy would be
through the criminal case or the civil commitment process.
There is one additional potential wrinkle. Consider an example in which
a nonfelony defendant is out of custody at the time of his or her competency
evaluation. Suppose the evaluation concludes that the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, and that neither inpatient nor outpatient
competency-rendering treatment is likely to restore the defendant’s
competency. Suppose further that the court finds the defendant not
competent and unlikely to regain competency. Under those facts, the court
must dismiss the case and order that the defendant be evaluated for civil
commitment.103 Clearly the inpatient evaluation provision will not apply to
our defendant, who is not in custody.104 The issue is whether the outpatient
evaluation provision applies: is the defendant “on conditional release at the
time of the dismissal”?105 Clearly the legislature would want such a
defendant evaluated for possible civil commitment, but the question is how
the legislature intended that to happen.
One alternative is for the court to conclude that an out-of-custody
defendant is essentially equivalent to a defendant on conditional release.106
That makes sense if there are any conditions attached to the defendant’s
release from custody, such as a condition that the defendant cooperate with
the competency evaluation or a condition that the defendant commit no
criminal law violations. Under those facts, the defendant is arguably
detained for purposes of the evaluation because his or her freedom is
curtailed. If the defendant is detained for a competency evaluation, whether
or not the defendant was initially in custody, then the defendant is arguably
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on a conditional release. If so, then the court would order the DMHP to
evaluate the defendant on an out-of-custody basis.107
A second alternative is for the court to conclude that the defendant,
though not held in jail, is in custody in the sense that he or she is subject to
terms of release, and therefore his or her freedom has been curtailed by the
court. This is similar to the rationale that permits a person on probation to
file a personal restraint petition even though he or she is not being held in
custody.108 Under that line of logic, the court must order the defendant
referred to Western State or Eastern State for an inpatient evaluation.109
A third alternative may be available if the competency evaluation
recommends that the defendant be evaluated for civil commitment by the
DMHP.110 In that case, the court would be required to order the DMHP to
conduct that evaluation pursuant to RCW 10.77.065.111
A fourth alternative is for the court to conclude that the mandatory
referral provisions of RCW 10.77 do not apply, but that the discretionary
provision for non-treatment-eligible nonfelony defendants does.112 Under
this alternative, the court, at least in theory, could choose not to refer the
defendant, which runs contrary to the clear intent behind the mandatory
referral provisions.113
(3) Transmittal of Information toTreatment Facility or DMHP
If an in-custody defendant is detained and sent to an evaluation and
treatment facility, that facility will only have seventy-two hours to decide
whether to file a petition for civil commitment.114 If a defendant on
conditional release is referred to the DMHP, the DMHP must examine the
defendant within forty-eight hours.115 In either case, the treatment facility
or the DMHP will immediately need records from the prosecutor. Those
records include the police report from the case, as well as other relevant
information, including the defendant’s criminal history and a certified copy
of the order setting forth the court’s finding that the defendant is in the
treatment-eligible category. Without that information and the order, the
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county prosecutor or assistant attorney general will not be able to file a civil
commitment petition on a timely basis.
c) Non-Treatment-Eligible Nonfelony Defendant Who is Incompetent
If the court ultimately finds that a non-treatment-eligible nonfelony
defendant is incompetent, then the court has these two alternatives: stay or
dismiss the proceedings and detain the defendant for a civil commitment
evaluation, or dismiss the case outright.116 The statute does not require that the
defendant be in custody in order for the court to detain. The dismissal should
be without prejudice, just as for treatment-eligible nonfelony defendants.117
The statute does not give any guidance for what happens if the court stays the
proceedings, and it is unclear how that would impact the case. The statute also
fails to give any guidance to the court regarding what is essentially a mental
health question: whether it is appropriate in a particular case to order that the
DMHP evaluate the defendant for civil commitment.
d) Illustrative Examples
The best way to understand the treatment-eligible and non-treatmenteligible provisions applicable to nonfelony defendants is to compare three
hypothetical fact patterns, one of which involves a felony case. Defendant
A is charged with second-degree theft for stealing a $750 overcoat in the
wintertime. Defendant B is charged with second-degree criminal trespass.
Defendant C is charged with fourth-degree assault by means of intentionally
inflicting bodily injury on another. All three defendants have been
evaluated by the staff at Western State as incompetent to stand trial. None
of the defendants have any criminal history, prior dismissals due to
incompetency, or acquittals by reason of insanity.118
Defendant A, charged with a felony, must be ordered into competencyrendering treatment for up to ninety days.119 If treatment proves
unsuccessful, the defendant could be ordered back for an additional ninety
days of treatment, at the court’s discretion.120 If the defendant is still not
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competent, and if the court or jury makes certain findings, the court may
extend the treatment another six months.121 Ultimately, if the defendant
does not regain competency, the court must dismiss the case without
prejudice and either begin civil commitment proceedings or release the
defendant.122
Defendant B is a non-treatment-eligible nonfelony defendant, and the
example assumes that RCW 10.77.065(1)(b) does not apply. The court has
two options. It may stay or dismiss the proceedings and detain the
defendant for sufficient time for the DMHP to evaluate the defendant for
civil commitment. In the alternative, it may dismiss the proceedings
outright.123
Defendant C is a treatment-eligible nonfelony defendant because the
pending charge involves a violent act, namely, assault by intentionally
inflicting bodily injury. The court can order that Defendant C be placed at
Western State for up to fourteen days of inpatient treatment to restore
competency; this period may be extended for up to an additional fifteen
days.124 At the end of that period, the defendant must return to court for a
competency hearing.125 If he or she is still not competent, but the court
determines that further treatment may restore competency, the court may
order Defendant C to undergo outpatient treatment of up to ninety days on a
conditional release.126 Of course, the court is also free to order outpatient
treatment pursuant to a conditional release first, and then inpatient treatment
if the conditional release is not successful.127 If, at the end of the treatment
period, or at any time following notice and a hearing, the court determines
that Defendant C is unlikely to return to competency, the court must dismiss
the charges and refer Defendant C for evaluation for possible civil
commitment.128
C. Involuntary Medication as Part of Competency-Rendering Treatment
One cannot examine the competency-rendering process without
considering the issue of involuntary medication. As a general proposition,
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defendants who are found incompetent suffer from acute episodes of severe
mental illness that are treated primarily with psychotropic medication.129
When in such an acute phase of illness, many defendants lack insight into
their illness and, therefore, refuse to take medication. The only feasible
option available for rendering a defendant competent in such cases is
involuntary medication.130
The circumstances under which a court may constitutionally authorize
involuntary medication for the sole purpose of restoring a criminal
defendant’s competency to stand trial have become quite complex as a
result of the Supreme Court decision in Sell.131 The purpose of this section
is to discuss the Sell decision and its potential implications for the
competency-rendering process in Washington.
1. Factual Setting in Sell
Charles Sell and his wife were charged with fifty-six counts of mail
fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money laundering.
The government later charged him with attempting to murder an FBI agent
and a potential witness in the fraud cases. The fraud and attempted murder
cases were joined for trial.132 Sell had exhibited bizarre behavior, and
eventually a federal magistrate found him incompetent to stand trial and
ordered that he be hospitalized for competency-rendering treatment at a
federal facility. The facility’s staff recommended that Sell take antipsychotic medication, which he refused to do. At that point, the facility
sought permission to medicate Sell involuntarily.133
Following a review process, a psychiatrist at the facility authorized
administering involuntary medication to Sell. The facility administratively
reviewed and upheld the psychiatrist’s determination.
The federal
magistrate authorized involuntary medication as well. The magistrate
stayed the order so Sell could appeal the issue to the federal district court.
The district court affirmed the magistrate’s order authorizing involuntary
medication as the only viable way to render Sell competent to stand trial.
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However, the district court found the magistrate’s determination—that Sell
was dangerous—to be clearly erroneous. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, focusing only on the fraud charges, also affirmed the district
court’s order authorizing forced medication to render Sell competent to
stand trial. The U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Eighth
Circuit’s ruling.134
2. Holding in Sell
The Supreme Court found that the orders in Sell did not meet the
necessary test and, thus, vacated the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and
remanded the case. The Court phrased the issue rather narrowly: Does the
U.S. Constitution permit the government to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication solely to render a defendant competent to stand trial
for serious but nonviolent crimes?135 In a 6–3 opinion, the Supreme Court
held that under limited circumstances, the Constitution permits the
government to administer psychotropic medication involuntarily to a
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges to render that
defendant competent to stand trial.136 The Court pointed out that “the
Government may pursue its request for forced medication on the grounds
discussed in this opinion, including grounds related to the danger Sell poses
to himself or others.”137 The Court cautioned that since “Sell’s medical
condition may have changed over time, the Government should do so on the
basis of current circumstances.”138
3. What the Sell Opinion Means in Practice
In couching the issue, the Supreme Court noted that Sell was charged
with serious but nonviolent crimes.139 While that seems to ignore the
attempted murder charges in the case, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion focused
“solely on the serious fraud charges,”140 which the Supreme Court appears
to have accepted as a limit to its review. As a practical matter, however,
subsequent case law appears to render the distinction meaningless, as the
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courts apply the Sell test to both violent and nonviolent charges. The Sell
opinion strongly implies that a court may not constitutionally order
involuntary medication in a criminal case that involves non-serious charges.
There are four questions that practitioners and trial courts must grapple
with in the aftermath of Sell: (1) What is a “serious” crime? (2) How will
the Sell test be applied in practice? (3) Can a trial court constitutionally
authorize involuntary medication in a case involving a non-serious
nonviolent crime solely for the purpose of restoring competency? (4) How
does Sell impact involuntary medication for purposes other than the sole
purpose of restoring competency?
a) Defining “Serious” Crimes
The Sell opinion seems to have accepted the Eighth Circuit’s
determination that the fraud charges are “serious.” The opinion’s lack of
discussion of what constitutes a “serious” crime implies that the trial court
must determine what is and what is not “serious.” While the Sell opinion
does not specify the criteria for a “serious” crime, statutory and case law
have provided some guidance.141 Remember, unless the current charge is
“serious,” the court cannot authorize involuntary medication, even if the
defendant is charged with a felony or is a treatment-eligible nonfelony
defendant.142
(1) Carries the Right to a Jury Trial
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Evans focused on the constitutional
right to a jury trial for guidance: a crime that is serious enough to warrant a
jury trial is serious for the purpose of a Sell analysis. Under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, a “serious” crime carries the right to a jury trial; a
non-serious or “petty” crime does not.143 For federal law purposes, any
crime carrying a maximum possible sentence of more than six months
carries the right to a jury trial and is therefore “serious.”144 If the Fourth
Circuit’s analysis—labeling as “serious” any criminal charge that affords a
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right to a jury trial—was applied in Washington, any criminal case would
be potentially “serious.” The Washington Constitution provides greater
rights to a jury trial than its federal counterpart. All persons charged with a
crime carrying any potential jail term are entitled to a jury trial.145 That
seems rather broad and, as discussed below, is most likely not the standard
for a “serious” crime in Washington.
(2) Designated “Serious” by State Legislature
In focusing on the maximum potential punishment to determine whether
a crime is “serious” for Sell purposes, the Evans court explained that
“[s]uch an approach respects legislative judgments regarding the severity of
the crime.”146 In other words, a state legislature is given great latitude to
define a “serious” crime. The Washington legislature has exercised its
discretion by declaring certain crimes as “serious” per se.147 The list
includes some nonfelony crimes, such as any nonfelony domestic violence
crime, harassment, and driving under the influence, or the local equivalents
of these.148
(3) Determined “Serious” by Court
Washington’s per se list of “serious” crimes also authorizes a court in a
particular case to find that a crime is “serious” after weighing certain
standards. These standards include whether the offense involves bodily or
emotional harm to another person, whether the offense impacts the local
citizens’ basic need for security, the number of potential or actual victims or
persons impacted by the alleged acts, and the maximum possible sentence
for the crime.149
(4) Designated “Serious” by Local Legislature
Prior drafts of the per se statute gave city and county legislatures the
authority to declare additional categories of crimes as “serious” per se, on
the basis of standards similar to those applicable to the courts.150 That
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authority did not survive in the final version of the statute, so it appears that
the state legislature intended to preempt the field except as to the extent it
has delegated such authority to the courts.
b) Applying Sell in Practice
The Supreme Court in Sell explained that there are four requirements for
constitutionally imposing involuntary medication to restore a defendant’s
competency to stand trial on serious charges.151 Although the Court never
stated what standard of proof the trial court should apply in determining
whether those four requirements have been met, the Second Circuit recently
held in U.S. v. Gomes152 that the clear and convincing standard applies. In
State v. Hernandez-Ramirez,153 Division Two of the Court of Appeals,
relying on the statutory standard for involuntary medication in the civil
commitment context, adopted the same test.154 The Ninth Circuit has not
yet weighed in on this issue.155
The four requirements identified in the Sell opinion are: (1) administering
involuntary medication to render the defendant competent must serve an
important governmental interest in the case; (2) involuntary medication
must significantly further that important governmental interest; (3)
involuntary medication must be necessary to further that interest; and (4)
involuntary medication must be medically appropriate for the particular
defendant.156 Each of these requirements is discussed below.
(1) Important Governmental Interest
The longer the potential sentence, or the potential for future confinement,
the stronger the governmental interest in involuntary medication for
competency-rendering treatment. While there is an important interest in
bringing to trial a defendant charged with a serious crime against persons or
property, the trial court still must consider the facts of the individual case in
evaluating the importance of that interest.157 The Sell opinion noted two
specific considerations, namely, the potential for future confinement,
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including civil commitment, and whether the defendant has already been
confined for a lengthy time.158
With respect to the potential for future confinement, the court will look to
the crime charged. For felonies, the court can calculate the potential
standard sentencing range under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981
(SRA).159 For nonfelonies, the maximum sentence will be one year or
ninety days, depending on the charge, and there may or may not be a
mandatory minimum.160
Under Washington’s civil commitment laws, there are some practical
complications in estimating the potential for future civil commitment. For
example, it is virtually impossible for a trial court to know whether a
defendant will be civilly committed, or even to have a well-informed basis
on which to predict whether civil commitment is likely and if so, under
what conditions. Civil commitment proceedings are not necessarily
handled by the same prosecuting agency, the same judge or court system, or
the same defense attorney as the criminal case.161
In addition, except for limited exceptions, civil commitment proceedings
are confidential.162 However, in 2004, the legislature amended the
confidentiality provisions to help open the lines of communication between
the civil commitment and criminal justice systems when competencyrendering treatment is at issue.163 Thus, civil commitment records and
information under RCW 71.05 may now be disclosed to a court or its
designee when there is a pending motion requesting court authority for
involuntary medication as part of competency-rendering treatment under
RCW 10.77.164 Additionally, the criminal court, when considering whether
to authorize involuntary medication as part of competency-rendering
treatment, is now required to ask the prosecutor and defense attorney, who
are required to answer to the extent they are aware, whether the defendant is
the subject of civil commitment proceedings.165
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(2) Significantly Furthers Governmental Interest
Second, the trial court must conclude that involuntary medication would
significantly further the governmental interest. That means the court must
find that the medication is substantially likely to restore competency, but at
the same time be substantially unlikely to have side effects that will
interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist in conducting a
defense.166 This test is likely to pose far more problems for prosecutors in
nonfelony cases than in felony cases. With a fourteen- to twenty-nine-day
competency-rendering period for nonfelony crimes,167 it is hard to imagine
a large number of cases in which a qualified mental health professional
could render an opinion that there is a substantial likelihood that involuntary
medication will restore competency. On the other hand, felonies carry a
competency-rendering period of 90–365 days.168 In that amount of time,
there is a greater likelihood that a qualified mental health professional could
opine that there is a substantial likelihood the medication could restore
competency. Of course, the trial court is not bound by the opinion of the
mental health professional, especially if the defense presents contradictory
testimony from its own expert.169
From a pragmatic as well as legal standpoint, a key question is whether
statistical probabilities may be used to establish a substantial likelihood of
restoration. Federal case law supports the concept that the prosecution can
rely upon a statistical probability that psychotropic medication will restore
competency, though the cases do not specify a minimum probability that
would still satisfy Sell.170
Another key question is whether the prosecution must identify the
particular medication or merely the class of medication that would be
administered. Unless the defendant’s mental health history shows that he or
she has had particular success with a specific medication, it is unlikely the
court could authorize involuntary medication.171 At the present time,
Washington case law supports the proposition that the prosecution only
needs to establish the class of medication to be administered. In State v.
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Hernandez-Ramirez,172 Division Two affirmed a trial court order
authorizing involuntary medication on the basis of testimony, from two
doctors, that antipsychotic medications are the typical form of treatment for
the defendant’s mental illness. The federal courts are divided; some require
the prosecution to identify the specific medication to be administered,173
while others require the prosecution to identify only the class of medication
to be administered.174
(3) Necessary to Further Governmental Interest
The third Sell requirement for constitutionally authorizing involuntarily
administered medication is that the medication must be necessary to further
the important governmental interest. Demonstrating the necessity of
involuntarily medicating a defendant requires a finding that less intrusive
alternatives are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.175 In the
Sell opinion, the Supreme Court included the troubling example of “a court
order to the defendant backed by the contempt power” as a less intrusive
alternative.176 This suggestion is troubling because, with respect to the
opinion’s concerns about constitutional due process, it is difficult to
differentiate between “involuntary medication” on the one hand and
“voluntary medication” pursuant to a court order backed by contempt power
on the other. Both contain an element of coercion that was a key
constitutional concern for the Sell Court. This language runs contrary to the
tenor of the majority’s entire discussion of the involuntary medication issue.
Furthermore, the Court’s language implies that the trial court should take
into consideration the defendant’s willingness to take medication
voluntarily. On the surface, this suggestion appears to be a feasible
possibility in felony cases because of their long restoration periods. The
trial court could order the defendant to be transported to Western State or
Eastern State and if the defendant takes his or her medication, nothing
further needs to be done. If the defendant refuses, he or she could be
returned to court for a hearing on the issue of involuntary medication, and if
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the trial court authorizes this action, there would still be sufficient time left
in the treatment period for the competency-rendering treatment to be
successful.
This wait-and-see approach, however, creates logistical problems that are
not addressed in the Sell opinion. For example, bed space at Western State
and Eastern State is limited, and using that bed space for the sole purpose of
determining whether the defendant is willing to take medication voluntarily
takes that bed space away from another defendant. That, in turn, could
result in longer transport times for those defendants waiting for bed space.
In addition, resources expended waiting to see if a defendant will take
medication voluntarily would be unavailable to other defendants who need
treatment.177 Though quite valid, these drawbacks do not relate to the
specific defendant who is the subject of the “Sell hearing.” It is unlikely
that fiscal concerns and policy choices about the extent of services available
at state psychiatric hospitals would satisfy Sell’s constitutional criteria.
In nonfelony cases, by contrast, the relatively short inpatient restoration
period does not lend itself to a wait-and-see approach. Waiting to see if a
defendant agrees to take medication voluntarily could use up several days,
or even one week, of treatment time. That would leave little, if any, time to
return the defendant to court, hold an involuntary medication hearing, return
the defendant to inpatient treatment, and still have a substantial likelihood
of successful restoration. While the court could consider ordering
outpatient treatment of up to ninety days for a nonfelony defendant in order
to see if he or she voluntarily takes medication, the downside of this
approach outweighs both its suitability and its usefulness. First and
foremost, outpatient competency-rendering treatment may not be
appropriate for the defendant because of the defendant’s risk to the
community. It is also possible that the defendant’s level of functioning is
such that the defendant is incapable of complying with outpatient treatment.
Second, it is much more difficult for an outpatient treatment facility to
monitor whether the defendant is voluntarily taking his or her medication,
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especially if the medication is not the type that can be monitored by testing
the medication levels in the defendant’s blood. Although this concern can
be mitigated somewhat by delivering medication through an intramuscular
shot at specific intervals, not every medication can be administered in this
manner.
(4) Medically Appropriate
Lastly, the trial court must find that involuntary medication is medically
appropriate. That means the medication is in the defendant’s best medical
interest in light of the defendant’s medical condition.178 Presumably, the
trial court would need to consider the potential harmful side effects of the
medication, either medical or related to the defendant’s ability to obtain a
fair trial. It may be hard to imagine how relieving severe symptoms of a
mental disorder could do anything but benefit a defendant. But consider a
situation in which a defendant suffered severe emotional or psychological
trauma in his or her past, and the psychiatrist testified at the “Sell hearing”
that involuntarily medicating the defendant would likely trigger a severe
psychological response because of that trauma, which would do far more
psychological harm than good.179 The benefits of the involuntary
medication would be more than offset by the potential emotional or
psychological harm to that particular defendant.
c) Authorizing Involuntary Medication in Cases Involving Non-Serious,
Nonviolent Crimes Solely for the Purpose of Restoring Competency
The Sell case sets a very high standard for authorizing involuntary
medication in cases involving serious crimes. It is unlikely that a court may
constitutionally authorize involuntary medication if the defendant is not
charged with a serious crime.
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d) Involuntary Medication for Reasons Other Than Restoring Competency
The Sell opinion noted that the trial court does not have to go through the
tests set out in Sell if the medication is warranted for a purpose other than
competency-rendering treatment. The Supreme Court cited Washington v.
Harper180 as an example.181 In Harper, the Court upheld procedures for
involuntarily medicating prison inmates on the basis of potential
dangerousness. The difficulty with basing involuntary medication on
dangerousness considerations is that there must be some procedural scheme
under which the trial court could also act. The civil commitment statute
clearly states that a person suffering from a mental disorder “may not be
involuntarily committed for treatment of such disorder except pursuant to
provisions of [RCW 71.05], chapter 10.77 RCW, chapter 71.06 RCW,
chapter 71.34 RCW, transfer pursuant to RCW 72.68.031 through
72.68.037, or pursuant to court ordered evaluation and treatment not to
exceed 90 days pending a criminal trial or sentencing.”182 Unless the
defendant is already engaged in the civil commitment process under RCW
71.05 or some other statutory commitment process, it seems unlikely that a
trial court could order involuntary medication on the basis of dangerousness
without offending principles of either statutory or constitutional procedural
due process.
D. Mandatory Referrals for Civil Commitment Evaluation
The competency evaluator’s report must include a recommendation to the
court regarding whether the DMHP should examine the defendant for possible
civil commitment, and whether the court should keep the defendant under its
control.183 The Act created a process which requires courts to refer a
defendant for a civil commitment evaluation if the competency evaluation
recommends it.184 The court must make the referral even if the court
ultimately finds the defendant competent.185 Given the tragic stabbing death of
a retired firefighter, which created much of the impetus behind the Act,186 it
seems likely that the legislature intended that this process serve as a catch-all
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safety net for situations not covered by other provisions of the competency
statutes. Unfortunately, there are some gaps in this catch-all provision.187
However, the legislature can eliminate those gaps by amending the statute to
provide for a smoother transition from the competency restoration process to
the civil commitment process.188

IV.

DEFENDANTS AT THE POST-JUDGMENT PHASE

A defendant who is competent before the judgment may become
incompetent at the post-judgment phase.189 Post-judgment competency
issues may arise either at a sentencing hearing or at a probation violation
hearing. The purpose of this section is to identify the complex issues
involving a defendant’s competency to proceed at the post-judgment phase.
The section begins by discussing what constitutes a judgment and
examining how that definition works in practice. After examining the
similarities between the pre-judgment and post-judgment competency
processes, the section concludes by exploring in great detail the differences
between those two processes and illustrating the impact of those
differences.
A.

Defining Post-Judgment Cases Under Ch. 10.77 RCW

Any discussion of the consequences of a defendant’s incompetency at the
post-judgment phase presupposes that the term “judgment” in the criminal
context is clearly defined; that is not the case. As explained by noted legal
scholar Karl Tegland, in the felony context,190 the “rules [of appellate
procedure] make no effort to define a final judgment, and perhaps wisely
so. At common law, a final judgment was one that disposed of all of the
issues as to all of the parties . . . . No better definition seems to have
evolved.”191 Mr. Tegland noted that in the nonfelony context, “courts have
had difficulty defining a final judgment except in a circular fashion.
However, final judgments in courts of limited jurisdiction will generally be
. . . the judgment and sentence in a criminal case.”192
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One source of guidance in interpreting the meaning of “final judgment”
might be the criminal court rules. For example, the procedural rules for
superior and municipal/district courts provide that a “judgment of
conviction” must include “the verdict . . . and the adjudication and
sentence.”193 That implies that a judgment must include the sentence. But
for purposes of post-judgment relief, a motion for arrest of judgment must
be filed and served within ten days after the verdict or decision for felonies
and five days after the verdict or decision for nonfelonies.194 By statute, a
collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may not “be
filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment
and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction.”195
One might also look to the practical nature of the proceeding rather than
its name to determine whether the case is pre- or post-judgment. The
difficulty with this approach is that the distinction is not clearly spelled out,
leaving the courts too little guidance, which in turn could result in courts
across the state treating the same type of proceedings inconsistently. Postjudgment cases generally fall into either of two categories: cases in which
there has been a guilty plea or guilty finding, and cases in which the
defendant is obligated to fulfill certain conditions in order to have charges
dismissed or reduced to less serious ones.
1. Guilty Plea or Finding
a) Sentencing
Before a court can reach sentencing, there must be a conviction of some
sort, which can result from a guilty plea or a finding of guilt. As discussed
above, the court rules require a criminal judgment to include the sentence
imposed. Sentencing does not always occur at the time of conviction, so it
is conceivable that a defendant could be competent at the time he or she is
convicted but become incompetent at a sentencing hearing held weeks or
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months later. Court rules require that the written judgment include the
sentence imposed, and because a defendant cannot be sentenced while
incompetent,196 a sentencing hearing appears to have one foot in the prejudgment camp and the other in the post-judgment camp.
b. Suspended Sentence
Suspended sentences, authorized by statute in both felony197 and
nonfelony198 cases, provide the classic example of post-judgment matters.
Stated simply, a suspended sentence occurs when the court imposes a
sentence but suspends execution of all or a portion of the sentence.199
According to the Criminal Rules, the “judgment” regarding a conviction
must contain, among other things, the sentence.200 The terms of a
suspended sentence are reflected in the judgment and sentence, thereby
meeting the definition of judgment. Thus, a probation violation proceeding
involving a suspended sentence is clearly a post-judgment matter.
c) Deferred Sentence
Deferred sentences are creatures of municipal and district courts.201 With
a deferred sentence, the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial,
but the court defers imposing sentence for a designated period of time until
the defendant has completed certain prescribed conditions. If the conditions
are completed, the case is dismissed.202 If the defendant willfully violates
the conditions, the court has the discretion to revoke the deferred sentence
and impose either a straight sentence or a suspended sentence.
Interpreting the court rules strictly leads to the conclusion that a court
order deferring sentence following a conviction would not be considered a
“judgment” unless, and until, the court revoked the deferred sentence and
imposed either a straight sentence or a suspended sentence. However, the
Washington Supreme Court recognized the unfair position a defendant
would face if a deferred sentence were not considered a “judgment.” In
State v. Proctor, the supreme court explained that such a defendant would
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“be confronted with a ‘Hobson’s choice’ between waiving his or her appeal,
and serving a sentence or paying a fine or both, to secure deferment; or
insisting that a judgment and sentence be imposed that he or she could
exercise the constitutional guarantee of ‘the right to appeal in all cases.’”203
In order to avoid such an unfair result, the court found that a deferred
sentence is an appealable order. In other words, at least in the context of a
deferred sentence, a finding or verdict of guilty need not include a judgment
and sentence in order to be an appealable “judgment.” The reasoning in
Proctor makes similar sense in the competency context and, although a
deferred sentence differs from a suspended sentence in the sense that the
court does not “sentence” the defendant following a guilty verdict, guilty
finding, or guilty plea, a deferred sentence does appear to be a postjudgment matter.
d) Dispositional Continuance and Deferred Prosecution
Dispositional continuances204 and deferred prosecutions are also creatures
of municipal and district courts. Because they have some aspects that are
more like pre-judgment cases and some that are more like post-judgment
cases, they pose more difficult issues than deferred or suspended sentences,
which are clearly post-judgment matters. From a purely technical
standpoint, dispositional continuances and deferred prosecutions are prejudgment matters: the court does not enter a finding of guilty, either by plea
or following trial. Procedurally and pragmatically, however, dispositional
continuances and deferred prosecutions are more similar to post-judgment
probation cases than to pre-judgment cases, and it seems more logical to
treat them as post-judgment cases. The conditions imposed as part of the
dispositional continuance, or deferred prosecution, are similar to conditions
of probation that might be imposed as part of a suspended or deferred
sentence, and are often monitored by a probation officer. And if the court
finds the defendant willfully failed to comply with the terms of the
dispositional continuance or deferred prosecution, the court can revoke the
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agreement, read the police report and, in all likelihood, find the defendant
guilty. The defendant has essentially given up his or her right to a
meaningful trial, and the dispositional continuance or deferred prosecution
is more along the lines of a submittal.205
A dispositional continuance is an agreement between the prosecution and
the defendant. If the defendant fulfills the conditions of the agreement, the
court either amends the charge to a less serious one or dismisses the charge
outright. If the court finds the defendant willfully failed to comply with the
agreement, it has discretion to revoke the dispositional continuance and
determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on the documents
submitted as part of the agreement.206
Deferred prosecutions are a statutorily authorized form of dispositional
continuance, and are limited to nonfelony crimes that are “the result of or
caused by alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental problems for which the
person is in need of treatment and unless treated the probability of future
reoccurrence is great . . . .”207 If the defendant successfully completes the
conditions of the deferred prosecution, the court dismisses the case.208 If
not, the court may revoke the deferred prosecution, read the police report,
and determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on the police
report.209 Deferred prosecutions differ from dispositional continuances in
one other respect: the court may grant a petition for deferred prosecution
over the prosecution’s objection.210
B. Proceedings Common to Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Competency
Matters
1. Ordering the Competency Evaluation
If the court believes that the defendant’s competency is at issue, even in a
post-judgment matter, it seems clear that the court must order a competency
evaluation and conduct a competency hearing. RCW 10.77.060, which
applies to competency evaluations, does not appear by its terms to be
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limited to pre-conviction matters. The court may order a competency
evaluation of a defendant, “[w]henever . . . there is reason to doubt his or
her competency.”211 If the court finds the defendant competent, then the
sentencing or probation violation matter can proceed. But if the court finds
the defendant incompetent, then the court must determine what options exist
in the absence of clear statutory direction.
2. Proceedings Halted
Under statutory law, the court may not sentence an incompetent
defendant; a defendant may not be “tried, convicted or sentenced” while
incompetent.212 Under case law, probation violation hearings are treated
similarly. In State v. Campbell, the supreme court held that the trial court
was powerless to alter a defendant’s probation during the time he was at
Western State Hospital being evaluated for competency.213
C. Different Proceedings for Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment
Competency Matters
The lack of statutory process for defining and handling post-judgment
and quasi-post-judgment cases sets up a classic form over substance trap.
The form factor, based on a literal reading of court rules, requires the court
to treat many settled cases in a manner not contemplated by the competency
statute or by the parties to the case. The substance factor recognizes that
many cases settle in a fashion other than by straight guilty plea or guilty
verdict. Yet it may not take into account some subtle nuances that arise
regarding the court’s jurisdictional period. Each type of resolution that is
arguably post-judgment is discussed in turn below.
1. Competency-Rendering Treatment
The most significant difference between pre- and post-judgment matters
is whether the court may order that the defendant undergo competencyrendering treatment. The competency-rendering provisions specify the
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conditions under which a felony or nonfelony defendant at the pre-judgment
stage is eligible for competency-rendering treatment;214 there are no similar
provisions for the post-judgment phase. As this section demonstrates, one
can make two contrasting arguments—one of which would limit the court’s
authority to authorize competency-rendering treatment and the other of
which would expand its authority.
The first argument is that the court lacks authority to impose
competency-rendering treatment upon an incompetent defendant at the postjudgment phase. Under this view, the lack of statutory authority for
competency-rendering treatment reflects the legislature’s intent to limit
competency-rendering treatment to pre-judgment cases.
The contrasting argument is that the court has inherent authority to order
the defendant into competency-rendering treatment. The difficulty with this
approach is that the few cases discussing the court’s inherent authority to
address competency issues apply either to ordering a competency evaluation
or to holding a competency hearing.215 In addition, the competencyrendering treatment provisions are rather comprehensive.
The extent to which the legislature intended to leave room for a court to
exercise an inherent authority not granted to it by statute is certainly open to
debate. Although the factual setting in Campbell included competencyrendering treatment for a defendant facing probation violation proceedings,
the supreme court never reached the issue of whether the trial court had
inherent authority to order that treatment.216
Even if the court has inherent authority to order competency-rendering
treatment in a sentencing or probation violation matter, the issue of the
extent of that authority is still problematic. It seems illogical to think that a
court has broader inherent authority to order treatment in a post-judgment
case than it has statutory authority to do so in a pre-judgment case.
Otherwise, there would be no need for the statutory authority.
Two fact patterns illustrate the point. First, if a nonfelony non-treatmenteligible defendant is awaiting trial, the court could not order competency-
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rendering treatment. Does it make sense, then, that the court could use its
inherent authority to order competency-rendering treatment if the defendant
were awaiting a probation violation hearing instead of a trial? Second, if a
felony defendant or a nonfelony treatment-eligible defendant is awaiting
trial, the court must order competency-rendering treatment. Does it make
sense that the court could use its inherent authority to order competencyrendering treatment for a longer period in a post-judgment case than it could
in a pre-judgment case?
Logic therefore implies that if a court has inherent authority to order
competency-rendering treatment in a sentencing or probation violation
matter, its authority is defined and limited, at least in part, by the prejudgment restoration provisions. Yet, the more the court must rely on a
statute to define and limit its inherent authority, the weaker the argument
that the court has that inherent authority in the first place. But even if the
court does have such inherent authority, the court has the discretion to
exercise it or decline to exercise it.
2. Consequences if Defendant Not Competent
a) Dismissal of Charges
The competency-rendering provisions for pre-judgment cases expressly
require the court to dismiss the case without prejudice if the defendant
either remains incompetent following competency-rendering treatment or is
ineligible for competency-rendering treatment.217 Because suspended and
deferred sentences are expressly post-judgment matters,218 there is no
danger of an absurd result, such as requiring the court to dismiss a case in
which the defendant has been convicted.
b. Sentencing Hearings
Sentencing hearings occur only after a finding of guilt. The most logical
interpretation is that sentencing is a post-judgment matter. However,
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sentencing might arguably be called a pre-judgment matter, in that the court
rules require that the judgment include an order setting out the sentence,219
but a defendant may not be sentenced while he or she is incompetent.220
This means that the court cannot issue an order on judgment and sentencing
as required by court rule. Yet such a strict interpretation leads to an absurd
result. Assume a defendant is competent to stand trial and is convicted by a
jury. Assume further that between the jury verdict and the sentencing
hearing the defendant becomes incompetent. If sentencing was considered
pre-judgment and the defendant was incompetent, either following
competency-rendering treatment or if competency-rendering treatment was
not authorized, then the court must dismiss the case without prejudice.221
However, there is no statutory mechanism by which the court may vacate
the conviction, which means the defendant has been convicted in a case in
which the charge has been dismissed.
The analysis is no simpler if one treats sentencing as a post-judgment
matter. The court must still grapple with one very thorny issue: what
should the court do about sentencing the defendant? Absent specific
legislation, the court has three possible alternatives, though none is without
drawbacks.
(1) Continue Sentencing to Re-Evaluate Competency
One alternative is to continue sentencing to re-evaluate the defendant’s
competency at a later date. There are some difficult questions raised by this
approach. For example, how long can the court keep continuing the case?
If the defendant is in custody, there are serious due process issues in
continuing a case for an indeterminate time while the defendant remains in
custody.222
Even if the defendant is not in custody, there are other difficult issues.
Superior, municipal, and district courts have varying periods of probation,
depending on the particular crime for which the defendant is convicted.223
But what happens if the court cannot impose a sentence? How often can the
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court order competency evaluations? At some point, continued evaluations
become futile. Can the court decide not to order future evaluations?
Suppose the court orders the defendant to return to be re-evaluated. Can the
court order that the defendant be sent to Western State or Eastern State for
an inpatient evaluation? Suppose the court orders instead that the defendant
be evaluated on an outpatient basis, but the defendant fails to show for the
evaluation. Does the court have authority to issue a bench warrant when the
court has already found the defendant incompetent? Finally, what does the
court do if the defendant is in custody? It may seem like there are a lot of
questions without any obvious answers. That is why it is better to resolve
competency issues before trial or a plea.
(2) Close the Case Administratively
A second alternative is to take no action for a period of time and close the
case administratively, unless the court has reason to believe the defendant’s
mental state has changed for the better. The primary advantage of this
alternative is closure on the case. It is also possible, especially in larger
urban jurisdictions, that the defendant will come back into the system on a
new charge and either be competent to proceed, or eligible for competencyrendering treatment.224 But there are real dangers in this approach from a
public-safety policy perspective that generally substantially outweigh the
advantages. The notion of waiting for a mentally ill defendant to commit a
new crime so he or she can be sentenced on an older crime is risky. Closing
out a case without trying to sentence the defendant does nothing to protect
public safety or stop future criminal behavior by the defendant. This
approach should be used with extreme caution and only after serious
consideration.
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(3) Be Sure the Defendant is Competent Before Going to Trial or Taking a
Guilty Plea
Some, though probably not all, sentencing competency issues can be
avoided with advance planning. Sentencing often occurs shortly after
conviction at trial or entry of a guilty plea. If there is any reason to doubt
the defendant’s competency at this earlier stage, it is better to seek a
competency evaluation before the verdict or finding of guilt than to wait
until sentencing to do so. First, due process precludes convicting an
incompetent defendant. Second, it is much more difficult to resolve
competency issues at the sentencing phase than it is at the guilt phase.
Consider State v. Marshall.225 Henry Marshall pled guilty to murder, and
the trial court, after a summary colloquy, found that he was competent to
enter the plea. After the plea, the prosecution notified Marshall’s attorney
that it was seeking the death penalty.226 Marshall moved to withdraw his
guilty plea on the ground of incompetency at the time of the plea, but the
trial court denied his motion.227 The Washington Supreme Court held that,
“where a defendant moves to withdraw [a] guilty plea with evidence the
defendant was incompetent when the plea was made, the trial court must
either grant the motion to withdraw [the] guilty plea or convene a formal
competency hearing required by RCW 10.77.060.”228 Since the trial court
did neither, the supreme court vacated Marshall’s conviction and remanded
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.229
In lieu of vacating Marshall’s conviction, the court could have remanded
the case for the trial court to conduct a retrospective competency hearing at
the time of sentencing to determine the defendant’s competency at the time
of the guilty plea or guilty finding.230 Because competency can change over
time, the accuracy of such a retrospective hearing may be open to question,
especially if a significant amount of time has passed between the plea or
finding of guilt and the sentencing hearing.231
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c) Probationary Period
(1) Suspended and Deferred Sentences
If the defendant is incompetent to proceed with the revocation hearing,
does that toll the running of the probationary period? There is authority to
support the conclusion that the probation jurisdiction is tolled while the
defendant is incompetent. Campbell232 involved a defendant on felony
probation under the old indeterminate sentencing law.233 The supreme court
held that, during the time the defendant was committed to a mental hospital
to determine his competency, he was beyond the supervision of the court.234
Consequently, the defendant’s term of probation was tolled during that time
and re-commenced once he regained competency.235
In Spokane v. Marquette,236 the supreme court applied Campbell and
other cases involving tolling felony probation to the issue of tolling
probation in a nonfelony case when a defendant has failed to appear at a
hearing.237 The court noted that although Campbell and the other cited
cases involved felony probation, “the principle is the same in municipal
court, so we find them persuasive.”238 It therefore appears that Campbell
applies to municipal and district courts.239
Issues left unresolved include how long probation should be tolled, and
what event will cause probation to re-commence. If the reasoning of
Campbell and other cases involving tolling probation is applied, then
probation is to be tolled as long as the defendant remains incompetent. If
so, then what mechanism exists to restart the probation period? One
alternative is to re-commence the probation period once the defendant
appears before the court in which the probation matter is pending to
establish that he or she is now competent. This is consistent with the timefor-trial rules when a defendant fails to appear. The time-for-trial period
begins running when the defendant appears again before the court.240 It is
important to note, though, that the defendant, who might be incompetent for
a long or short period before regaining competency, is likely ill-equipped to
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initiate the process by which the probation period and conditions
recommence.
(2) Dispositional Continuances and Deferred Prosecutions
As long as the court issues a written order for a competency evaluation,
there should be no time-for-trial issues. The time-for-trial period is tolled
once the court issues a written order for a competency evaluation.241 The
triggering event is the written order for an evaluation; it is not enough for
the court to note that the issue has been raised.242 The time-for-trial period
re-commences when the court issues a written order finding the defendant
competent.243 If the defendant entered into a two-year dispositional
continuance, the time-for-trial period would be tolled during the period of
incompetency.244
With respect to deferred prosecutions, before the court can accept a
petition for deferred prosecution, it must find that the defendant has
knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to a speedy trial.245 In
addition, the “[d]elay in bringing a case to trial caused by a petitioner
requesting deferred prosecution as provided for in this chapter shall not be
grounds for dismissal.”246
d) Modifying “Probation” Conditions
The court in Campbell stated in dictum that the trial court in that case
was “powerless to alter defendant’s probation” during the time he was being
treated at Western State.247 That makes sense because the probationary
period was also tolled while the defendant was undergoing competencyrendering treatment. While the extent to which Campbell applies to district
and municipal court probation has not been litigated, the reasoning still
seems applicable, especially in light of Marquette.248 Dispositional
continuances are agreements between the prosecution and the defendant.
Analogizing to true probation cases and Campbell, it would seem that the
court could not modify the terms of the dispositional continuance either.

PRISON AND DETENTION

Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 253

The deferred prosecution statute sets forth mandatory conditions.249 Clearly
the court could not modify mandatory conditions, whether or not the
defendant is competent to stand trial. Under the reasoning of Campbell, the
court would have no authority to modify any of the discretionary conditions
either.250
e) Referral to Civil Commitment System
Regardless of how the court decides the issue of its inherent authority to
order competency-rendering treatment in a post-judgment case, there are
three situations in which the court would need to consider whether, and
how, to refer the defendant for a potential civil commitment evaluation
under RCW 71.05.251 The first situation is when the court finds that it does
not have inherent authority to order the defendant competent. The second is
if the court finds that it does have inherent authority, but chooses not to
order the competency-rendering treatment. The third is if the court orders
the competency-rendering treatment, but the defendant remains
incompetent.
From a public-safety standpoint, it is vital that the court consider
referring the defendant to the DMHP for civil commitment evaluation under
any of those three scenarios. But the mandatory referral provision does not
appear on its face to require that the court order the DMHP to evaluate the
defendant if he or she is awaiting sentencing or a probation violation
hearing.252 Nor do other provisions of the statutory scheme provide
guidance. The court has express statutory authority to detain an
incompetent defendant for civil commitment evaluation prior to judgment,
but there is no such express authority for post-judgment cases.253 While one
might argue the old standby of inherent authority to detain the defendant for
a civil commitment evaluation, there is very little support for that authority.
Detaining a defendant for civil commitment evaluation is far different than
committing a defendant in a criminal case for competency evaluation. The
former more closely resembles a civil commitment proceeding, which is
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governed by an entirely different statutory scheme; the latter is more similar
to the criminal procedures applicable to nonfelony defendants at the prejudgment state.254
The only practical procedure would be for the court to direct the DMHP
to evaluate the defendant for possible civil commitment, but to do so prior
to the court’s decision to strike the sentencing or probation violation hearing
because of the defendant’s incompetency. If the defendant is already in
custody, the court avoids having to detain the defendant in custody solely
for purposes of the civil commitment evaluation. If the defendant is out of
custody, the court could order the defendant to report to the DMHP at a
specified location, prior to or at the hearing. If the defendant fails to appear
for the evaluation before the court strikes the hearing, then the court could
issue a bench warrant. This procedure is less than satisfying.

V.

GETTING TO WHERE WE NEED TO BE

The issues identified above relate to all aspects of the criminal justice
process, from arraignment to sentencing, and overlap the civil commitment
system in many places.255 This section proposes solutions, described in
greater detail below, that resolve those issues in a global fashion; they
should be instituted as a whole in order to work effectively. The starting
point is the definition of mental illness in both systems. The legislature
should replace the phrase “mental disease or defect” in the competency
process with the phrase “mental disorder,” defined by its corresponding
definition in the civil commitment statute. The legislature can also increase
capacity and improve the efficiency of the competency process by
eliminating unnecessary components of the evaluation, thus simplifying the
competency-rendering process for both pre- and post-disposition cases.
Finally, there must be a smoother transition from the competency evaluation
process to the civil commitment process.
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A. Redefine the Mental Illness Component
One might say that the entire competency process revolves around the
definition of competency: as a result of some form of mental illness, does
the defendant lack the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings or
to assist in his or her own defense?256 Similarly, one might say that the civil
commitment process also revolves around the definition of mental illness.257
To the extent that the two processes overlap, it makes sense both legally and
from a mental health standpoint to use the same phrase and the same
definition of mental illness. To differentiate between “mental disease or
defect” and “mental disorder” is to split hairs; it makes more sense to
maintain a consistent definition. Although the court in Klein had the
opportunity to incorporate the civil commitment definition of “mental
disorder” into the competency statute, it did not do so; indeed, the opinion
does not even mention the civil commitment statutes.258 The legislature
should exercise its prerogative by changing the phrase “mental disease or
defect” in the competency statute to “mental disorder,” and incorporate the
definition of mental disorder contained in the civil commitment statute.259
B. Remove Unnecessary Complexity from the Evaluation Process
1. Limit the Competency Evaluation to its Necessary Components
The competency process involves an interrelated system rather than a
collection of separate procedures. That system is collapsing from its own
weight,260 due, at least in part, to the fact that the number of evaluations261
and the competency-rendering process262 have changed dramatically over
the years, while the basic contents of a competency evaluation report have
changed little over the past thirty years.263 This section discusses several
ways to reduce the length of time and the amount of resources it takes to
complete a competency evaluation without jeopardizing public safety.
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a) Eliminate the “Substantial Danger” Portion of the Dangerousness
Assessment
Under current law, competency evaluations must include an assessment
of the defendant’s dangerousness, expressed in two forms: an opinion as to
whether the defendant poses a substantial danger unless kept under further
control, and an opinion as to whether the defendant should be referred for a
civil commitment evaluation.264 The biggest step in safely reducing the
resources devoted solely to competency evaluations is to eliminate the
assessment of whether the defendant presents a substantial danger to public
safety, while retaining the assessment as to whether the defendant should be
evaluated for civil commitment.265
The opinion regarding whether the defendant is a substantial danger
relates directly to whether the court may extend competency-rendering
treatment for a felony defendant by an additional 180 days.266 It also relates
directly to whether the court is required to order such an evaluation, even if
it finds the defendant competent.267 However, that assessment comes with a
very high price tag: time spent evaluating and reporting on a defendant’s
potential dangerousness is time that cannot be spent evaluating other
defendants’ capacity to stand trial. The result is what is currently
happening: the state mental health system cannot handle the volume of
competency evaluations ordered. In addition, the “substantial danger”
assessment’s value to the court’s determination as to whether the felony
competency-rendering period must be extended is dubious at best. The
court does not consider the competency evaluation until months after the
evaluation occurs,268 by which time the dangerousness assessment is stale.
Setting a specific competency-rendering period for felony defendants, as
recommended below,269 would eliminate the need for using the substantial
danger portion of the dangerousness assessment as a tool for determining
whether the court must increase the competency-rendering treatment period
in felony cases.
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One argument in favor of retaining the substantial-danger portion of the
assessment is that it provides valuable information about the defendant’s
potential impact on public safety. If the court ultimately finds the defendant
competent to stand trial, the assessment will undoubtedly have an impact on
any ultimate resolution of the case. Without that assessment, the
prosecution, out of fear of harming public safety, is more likely to
recommend a harsh sentence. That will result in more cases going to trial
that could have been resolved earlier, which in turn will backlog an already
heavily backlogged criminal system.
That argument is not persuasive. Retaining the opinion as to whether the
defendant should be referred for a civil commitment evaluation would
provide similar information about any public-safety risks the defendant
poses, but would do so without unduly burdening the mental health
system.270 If implemented in conjunction with the other recommended
improvements to the competency process described below,271 retaining the
referral opinion would reduce unnecessary referrals to the civil commitment
system, freeing up additional resources.272 In addition, felony sentences are
governed by the SRA, which specifies sentencing guidelines based on the
crime charged, the defendant’s criminal history, and other statutory factors.
b) Eliminate the Requirement of Two Evaluators
Eliminating the requirement that there be at least two competency
evaluators would increase the number of evaluations that could be
completed without adding staff to Eastern State or Western State. Under
current law, the court must appoint a panel of at least two evaluators, at
least one of whom must be approved by the prosecutor, unless the parties
agree to rely on a single evaluator.273 The prosecutor’s approval right
makes sense; the defendant may also obtain his or her own separate expert,
at no cost to an indigent defendant.274 Because most, if not all, in-jail and
other outpatient evaluations are conducted with a single evaluator,
eliminating the second evaluator will only impact inpatient evaluations.
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Although the number of inpatient evaluations is far smaller than the number
of outpatient evaluations275—meaning the actual capacity added would be
relatively small—adding some capacity is better than none at all. For
evaluations that are more complex, and therefore more difficult for a solo
evaluator, Eastern State or Western State could still have the option to
assign more than one evaluator.
c) Separate the Insanity and Diminished Capacity Portions of the
Evaluation
Although the competency report must include an insanity or diminished
capacity opinion only if ordered by the court,276 it is still common for a
jurisdiction to include insanity and diminished-capacity opinions as part of
the evaluation, even if the defendant has given no indication that he or she
intends to rely on either defense.277 The time required to conduct an
unnecessary insanity and/or diminished capacity evaluation as part of the
competency evaluation reduces the number of other competency evaluations
that can be conducted. While that may be more of a training issue, or an
issue related to the particular forms a jurisdiction uses, separating out the
insanity and diminished capacity evaluations would help avoid confusion
and at least some inefficient use of time.
2. Integrate and Simplify the Competency-Rendering Process for
Felonies and Nonfelonies
The complexities in the competency-rendering process arise in large part
from what is best described as a piecemeal approach to competencyrendering treatment. The result is an increased number of hearings, each of
which requires that the defendant be transported to court from the treatment
facility. In many cases, the parties must present evidence so that the court
can make findings of fact and conclusions of law. By adopting a consistent
approach to felony and nonfelony cases that considers the practical realities
of competency-rendering treatment, the legislature can eliminate
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unnecessary hearings, reduce interruptions in the treatment process, and
focus scarce resources within the criminal justice and mental health systems
where they should be focused—on treatment. That means setting specific
competency-rendering treatment periods—a longer one for serious felonies,
a shorter one for non-serious felonies, one for serious nonfelonies that is
tied to involuntary medication, and no treatment for non-serious
nonfelonies.
a) Improving the Felony Process
The current felony process is easy to apply: if the defendant is charged
with a felony, then he or she must be ordered to undergo competencyrendering treatment for ninety days, followed by an optional ninety-day
period, potentially followed by another 180-day period.278 That process
requires at least two additional hearings after the initial competency hearing
and, with respect to the final 180-day period, at least some evidentiary
hearing and findings of fact. It also requires that the defendant’s treatment
be interrupted each time he or she must attend a court hearing. It is a given
that treatment resources, whether for competency-rendering treatment or for
civil commitment treatment, are limited—one cannot have one’s proverbial
cake and eat it too. That being said, the legislature can simplify the process
and maximize the efficiency with which it utilizes the state’s limited
treatment and criminal justice resources.
This article recommends that the legislature adopt a two-tiered felony
competency-rendering treatment period: a longer period for those charged
with felonies defined as “serious” for purposes of the Sell opinion with
respect to involuntary medication,279 such as 180 or 365 days; and a shorter
period for those charged with “non-serious” felonies, such as sixty or ninety
days. The treatment facility should be authorized to return the defendant to
court sooner if the facility concludes either that the defendant is rendered
competent or is unlikely to be rendered competent within the remaining
restoration period, just as it can under current law for nonfelonies.280 That
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would eliminate using bed space for a defendant who either no longer needs
it or will not respond to continued treatment. The actual length of the
periods must be related to the clinical likelihood of success rather than to
budgetary concerns—the period must be long enough to provide a
reasonable likelihood of success. Setting an appropriate period will require
input from the competency-rendering treatment providers.
Society clearly has an interest in rendering competent those charged with
serious felonies, but it also has an interest in rendering competent those
charged with non-serious felonies.281 While a significant number of
defendants can be rendered competent within a shorter period, such as sixty
or ninety days, there will be many who require longer treatment. A longer
competency-rendering treatment period increases the likelihood those
defendants will be rendered competent. Why not, then, simply provide a
longer treatment period for all defendants charged with a felony? Because
of limited resources. There are simply not enough hospital beds and
treatment staff to handle all of the restoration cases. Clearly, adopting a
lengthy restoration period for all felony defendants will not solve the
problem.
What about limiting competency-rendering treatment to those charged
with serious felony crimes? Society could focus its limited resources to
those serious cases, and thus, could afford a longer restoration period. The
longer period, in turn, would increase the number of felony defendants
rendered competent. Using the definition of “serious” that is applicable to
involuntary medication would eliminate one major element of the issue of
involuntary medication and would still provide a bright-line definition for
the courts to follow. It would also leave the legislature the flexibility to
define or re-define a “serious” offense in response to a changing society.282
The trade-off is that it would leave an entire class of felony defendants
ineligible for competency-rendering treatment. One might argue that it is a
waste of time to provide for restoration for a defendant charged with a nonserious crime; competency-rendering treatment almost always involves
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medication, and a defendant charged with a non-serious crime cannot be
medicated involuntarily.283
But a shorter felony restoration period
nevertheless lends itself to a wait and see approach in which the defendant
is given an opportunity to take medication voluntarily. If a defendant
declines to take medication voluntarily, then the treatment facility would
conclude that the defendant is unlikely to be restored and would return the
defendant to court rather than have the defendant unnecessarily take up bed
space.
b) Improving the Nonfelony Process
Washington’s competency-rendering laws predate the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Sell. The result is parallel processes: one for
determining whether a defendant is eligible for competency-rendering
treatment, and one for determining whether the treatment facility is
authorized to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication. In the
nonfelony arena, these parallel processes are so labyrinthine as to defy
explanation. The legislature has two options: refine the process so that it
works in practice, or avoid the issue entirely by discontinuing the process.
Because of public-safety concerns, the better option is to refine the process
so that it works in practice by adopting a bright-line standard for
competency-rendering treatment eligibility.
A nonfelony competency-rendering process serves no purpose unless it
provides a realistic opportunity to render competent a nonfelony defendant.
Assuming a sufficient restoration period, the process must also account for
the fact that most, but not all, nonfelony defendants will refuse to take
medication voluntarily. A defendant charged with a crime that is “serious”
for Sell purposes is potentially eligible for court-authorized involuntary
medication. As a practical matter, that means only nonfelony defendants
charged with a Sell-defined serious offense should be eligible for
competency-rendering treatment. While the court would still need to
conduct hearings regarding the rest of the Sell criteria in those cases in
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which the prosecution seeks authorization for the treatment facility to
administer involuntary medication, those hearings would involve a single
issue, and can often be handled, with the parties’ agreement, through
telephonic testimony from the psychiatrist.
Retaining the process does come with some costs. The process requires
sufficient resources and treatment time to provide a meaningful opportunity
for restoration, including hospital bed space, hospital staff, and criminal
justice resources for conducting eligibility hearings. It will still require
court hearings to determine a defendant’s restoration eligibility, but that
could be combined with the competency hearing itself, and some defendants
who could be restored will not be ordered into competency-rendering
treatment based on their charges.
Competency-rendering treatments for defendants charged with nonserious nonfelony charges is a poor use of limited treatment resources.
Because involuntary medication is not an option, the only defendants who
stand a reasonable chance of being rendered competent are those who agree
to take medication voluntarily. But it makes little sense to set a
competency-rendering treatment period long enough to adopt a wait-and-see
approach to whether the defendant will agree to take medication.
One could argue that the simplest nonfelony process is no nonfelony
process. However, the simplest solution is not always the best solution.
The impetus for the Act was the lack of a nonfelony restoration process
coupled with a gap in the civil commitment referral process.284
Discontinuing the process transfers crime-related public-safety concerns
from the criminal justice system to the mental health system, and transfers
the associated mental health-related costs from the state mental health
system to the local mental health system.
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3. Overlap with Civil Commitment System for Pre-Judgment
Defendants
At some point in the competency process, the criminal justice system
intersects the mental health system. The questions from society’s
standpoint are how best to ensure public safety and who should be charged
with that responsibility. The current competency process sets out several
methods for protecting public safety by referring defendants for civil
commitment,285 but does not necessarily apportion that responsibility
effectively.
a) Pre-Judgment Defendant Competent or Rendered Competent Following
Treatment
If the court finds the defendant competent based on the initial evaluation
or following competency-rendering treatment, one could argue that a civil
commitment referral is unnecessary. Prior to resolution, the court can
evaluate public-safety concerns just as it would in any other case, and
impose appropriate conditions of release or continued release. If the
defendant is ultimately convicted, the court can impose mental health
treatment as a condition of the sentence. If the defendant is acquitted or the
charges are dismissed and the competency evaluation does not recommend
a civil commitment referral, it would be appropriate for the court to release
the defendant outright. The only circumstance that creates difficulty is if
the defendant is acquitted, or the charges are dismissed, and the evaluation
recommends a civil commitment referral. Under current law, the court
would be required to refer the defendant for evaluation, but there is really
no mechanism to ensure that the evaluation can occur.286 One possible
solution is to create statutory authority for the court to detain the defendant
for some specific period following a dismissal for the DMHP to evaluate
the defendant for civil commitment. This is the current process for
nonfelony defendants who are not competent to stand trial.287 The
legislature should adopt a similar approach for competent defendants where
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the competency evaluation recommends a referral. It should adopt a time
frame similar to that contained in the civil commitment statute: seventy-two
hours, excluding weekends and holidays.288
b) Pre-Judgment Defendant Incompetent and Not Eligible for CompetencyRendering Treatment or Treatment is Unsuccessful
If the court finds the defendant incompetent and ineligible for
competency-rendering treatment, or if the competency-rendering treatment
does not render the defendant competent, one can make a strong argument
that the mental health system should step in to protect public safety, and
that the referral should be mandatory. That argument certainly makes sense
if the competency evaluation recommends a civil commitment referral. The
question becomes how best to carry out that referral. Current law is silent
on the process for referring an incompetent felony defendant for civil
commitment evaluation.289 The nonfelony referral process, and whether the
referral is to a state or county mental health professional, depends upon the
defendant’s custody status and restoration eligibility.290 This multiplicity of
referral avenues creates unnecessary confusion for both the criminal justice
and mental health systems. The simplest solution is to create a single
referral process that applies to felony and nonfelony defendants. The
recommendation for competent defendants in the preceding section would
work just as well for incompetent defendants.
But what if the competency evaluator does not recommend a civil
commitment referral? The initial tragedy that led to the Act involved an
incompetent nonfelony defendant who was not referred for civil
commitment despite a recommendation that the referral be made.291 A
mandatory referral makes sense if the competency evaluator recommends it,
since the mental health system is making a mental health-related
recommendation. The referral makes no sense if the mental health system
has already recommended against it, since it would burden the local mental
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health system with second-guessing an assessment made by the state mental
health system.
4. The Post-Judgment Process
The current process for post-judgment cases is simple to describe—there
is no process. In addressing this issue, the legislature must first define
“post-judgment” and then decide whether or not to provide a competencyrendering process. This article recommends that the legislature define
“post-judgment” to reflect current practice—that the legislature does not
provide a competency-rendering process, but that the legislature does
provide a mechanism for monitoring post-judgment defendants.292
a) Defining “Post-Judgment”
The practical reality is that sentencings, dispositional continuances, and
deferred prosecutions all bear the characteristics of traditional postjudgment matters—the case is essentially resolved, there will be no actual
trial (and in the case of sentencings there may already have been a trial),
and the defendant must face consequences. The legislature should amend
the competency statutes to reflect this reality by expressly defining
“judgment.” To avoid unforeseen consequences, i.e., impacting another
statutory scheme in which the definition of “judgment” has other
consequences, the legislature can limit the definition to RCW 10.77. The
time-for-trial period would not be at issue under the current rules.293
b) Monitoring the Defendant’s Situation Without a Restoration Process
and Overlap with the Civil Commitment System
A case does not end with the judgment; compliance with probation
conditions constitutes an important part of the criminal justice process. A
defendant’s lack of competency at post-judgment compliance hearings
blocks that important part of the process. The seemingly quick and easy
response would be to authorize competency-rendering treatment for all
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incompetent defendants, whether at the pre- or post-judgment stage. But
that comes with a significant cost—hospital bed space allocated to
competency-rendering treatment on post-judgment matters cannot be
utilized for other purposes, such as competency-rendering treatment for prejudgment defendants and/or civil commitment matters. On the other hand,
not providing a competency-rendering process could threaten public safety,
at least for some defendants, unless there is a process in place for the court
to monitor the defendant’s situation.
That system is already in place for defendants who are acquitted by
reason of insanity; depending on the defendant’s dangerousness, the court
either orders the defendant into inpatient treatment, into outpatient
treatment, or releases the defendant outright.294 The court can require
regular reports from the treatment provider and can revoke an outpatient
treatment plan by ordering the defendant into outpatient treatment for
violating the treatment plan.295 Because the nature of the treatment is based
on the defendant’s dangerousness, public safety is protected. As a failsafe,
privacy laws should be amended to allow for the criminal justice system to
receive information about the civil commitment status and to monitor the
defendant if, and/or when, the civil commitment process ends. The criminal
court’s jurisdiction over the defendant under the current statutory scheme is
the maximum period a defendant can be placed into some form of treatment
within the criminal justice system, and is the maximum possible sentence he
or she could have received upon conviction for any one of the charges.296
That limitation should continue so that the defendant is not subjected to the
court’s jurisdiction any longer than he or she would have been, absent the
finding of incompetence. If the defendant becomes competent, the court’s
jurisdiction continues as it would in any other case.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In 1998, the legislature responded to two highly publicized cases
involving mentally ill offenders. Its goals were straightforward: to increase
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public safety and to increase communication between the criminal justice
and mental health systems.297 The approach it took in overhauling the thenexisting system included new and bold steps, especially in the nonfelony
arena. The legislature’s efforts were necessary at the time, but we now have
eight years of experience on which to reflect, and an increasing volume of
cases that did not exist in 1998.
While the revamped laws adopted in 1998 went a long way towards the
two-pronged goals stated above, the time is ripe to address the changes that
have occurred since then. This article has recommended a series of changes
designed to create a better alignment between Washington’s criminal
competency laws and the practical realities of today’s circumstances. These
recommendations include using limited resources more efficiently, adopting
a competency-rendering process with specific treatment periods tied to the
likelihood the defendant will be rendered competent, providing for a
smoother interaction between the criminal competency process and the civil
commitment system, and clarifying the process relating to post-judgment
matters. If we adopt these recommendations, we can move Washington’s
criminal competency laws from where they are to where they should be.
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bail in a sentencing or probation violation matter if the court had not previously set bail.
But as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine a defendant who is in custody, without bail
having already been set, facing sentencing or a probation violation. The most likely
reason a defendant facing sentencing or a probation violation would be in custody is
because of a new pending charge (in which case, competency will be at issue on the new
charge as well), an inability to post previously set bail, or a bench warrant (for which the
court would have already set bail).
30
§ 10.77.060(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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31

The fifteen day maximum period for the examination appears by the language of the
statute to apply only to an inpatient examination at a mental health facility: the period
begins to run from the date of “admission to the facility,” and makes no reference to the
in-jail examination provision. The legislature added the second sentence of the quoted
material in 2004 further clouding the issue. If one infers a fifteen day limit for in-jail
examinations, then of what effect is the “date of admission to the facility” language in
terms of in-jail evaluations?
32
See Department of Social & Health Services, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE:
FORENSIC COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND RESTORATION—STRATEGIES TO MINIMIZE
WAITING PERIODS, 2 (2006) [hereinafter DHSH Report]. DSHS prepared ther report as
directed by the legislature. Id.; Chapter 504, Laws of 2005, Sec. 506(2).
33
See DSHS Report supra note 32 at Charts 1, 3. DSHS extrapolated Eastern State’s
2005 statistics based on the first nine months of 2005. Id. at Chart 3. Western State’s
2005 statistics are derived from a presentation given by Carl Redick, Psy.D with Western
State Hospital at the District and Municipal Court Judges’ Association’s Spring 2006
Conference, entitled A Mental Health Institution View, slide 12. Western State’s
database from which the statistics were gleaned is regularly updated and refined; the
statistics apply as of the date of the conference on June 13, 2006. All of the statistics
presented in this article relate to adult defendants.
34
Redick, supra note 33. “Outpatient” refers to evaluations other than in the hospital.
It includes evaluations in a jail facility as well as evaluations that occur in locations other
than a secure facility.
35
The number of in-jail evaluations began increasing at an alarming rate in 1998,
following a recommendation from the MIO Task Force that competency evaluations for
in-custody defendants occur in the jail if possible. In 2005, the legislature amended §
10.77.060 to expressly authorize the parties to agree that the evaluation should occur in
the jail. See Competency Examinations Act of 2004, supra note 13. That amendment
was directed primarily to evaluations by Eastern State. Evaluations by Western State
were, and continue to be, conducted primarily in jail, at least for nonfelony defendants.
36
Redick, supra note 33, slide 51.
37
§ 10.77.060(1)(a).
38
Redick, supra note 33, slide 51; DSHS Report, supra note 32, at 2.
39
Cristi Rust, et al. v. W. State Hosp., et al., No. C00-5479RJB, United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington at Tacoma, originally issued September 28,
2001 (“Rust Order”). (The initial order is on file with the author.)
40
See DSHS Report, supra note 32, at 4-5; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090 (2006)
(competency); § 10.77.110 (insanity acquittals); § 71.05.
41
For cases brought in district or superior court, the county prosecutor represents the
state and therefore the county bears the jail costs for those prosecutions. WASH. REV.
CODE § 36.27.020(4) (2006); § 39.34.180(1) (2006). For cases brought in municipal
courts, which include courts in which the city contracts with the county for court services,
the city bears responsibility for the prosecution and its attendant jail costs. § 3.46 (2006)
(municipal departments within a district court); § 3.50 (2006) (municipal courts for cities
with population under 400,000); ch. 35.20 (2006) (municipal courts for cities with
population over 400,000, i.e., the City of Seattle); § 39.34.180(1) (2006). for a detailed
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discussion of the cost to the state of competency evaluations in various settings, see
DSHS Report, supra note 32.
42
A defendant whose mental illness has never been treated adequately may never have
been competent to stand trial; the phrase “competency restoration” would be a misnomer
for that defendant. Accordingly, this article uses the phrase “competency-rendering” to
encompass either bringing about or restoring a defendant’s competency.
43
For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the defendant is not developmentally
disabled. The procedure for developmentally disabled defendants is somewhat different.
See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090 (2006).
44
§ 10.77.090(1)(b).
45
§ 10.77.090(3).
46
§ 10.77.090(4).
47
At this point in the proceedings the defendant has the right to a jury trial on the issue
of his or her competency. § 10.77.090(4).
48
The evaluation must contain an opinion about dangerousness, WASH. REV. CODE §
10.77.060(3)(f) (2006), but the judge or jury ultimately decides the issue.
49
§ 10.77.090(4).
50
§ 10.77.090(4).
51
See § 10.77.090(1)(d), (e).
52
Born v. Thompson, 117 P.3d 1098 (2005).
53
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(A). This includes insanity acquittals and incompetency dismissals
under federal or non-Washington state statutes equivalent to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.
54
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(23) (2006).
55
§ 10.77.010(23). The legislature added the definition of nonfatal injuries to abrogate
Division One’s holding in Born. See Born, 117 P.3d 1098.
56
§ 10.77.010(13). There are slightly different definitions of “violent act” and “history
of one or more violent acts” under section 71.05 of the Revised Code of Washington. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(18), (36) (2006).
57
Some may argue that creating a presumption against the defendant violates the
general constitutional due process principle that the burden of proof may never be shifted
to the defendant in a criminal case. But keep in mind that the “process” involved in
determining eligibility for competency-rendering treatment is statutorily created, not
constitutionally created. There is no process provided at all for a defendant charged with
a felony who is incompetent. Section 10.77.090(1)(b) automatically requires 90 days of
competency-rendering treatment. In any event, this is an issue that is best left to the
parties to brief and the courts to resolve.
58
As defined in the Criminal Records Privacy Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(1)
(2006).
59
See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.085 (2006). In Born, the parties stipulated to the
facts in the police report so the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether the
report would have been admissible without the parties’ agreement. Born v. Thompson,
117 P.3d 1098, 1099 (2005).
60
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
61
The “Crawford issue” refers to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses. See id.
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62

Since the defendant is not competent to stand trial, the defense would have a difficult
time convincing the judge that the defendant could testify competently at the hearing.
The defense would also have to grapple with the issue of the defendant’s right not to
testify and right not to incriminate himself or herself.
63
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(23)(b) (2006).
64
Born v. Thompson, 117 P.3d 1098, 1101 (2005).
65
Id. at 753-60.
66
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(b) (2006). The argument is that the question is one
of statutory due process rather than constitutional due process. That process is a rather
complex issue and is beyond the scope of this article.
67
§ 10.97.30(1).
68
§ 10.77.040; § 10.77.080.
69
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C).
70
Of course, a court can order Western State or Eastern State to provide outpatient
competency-rendering treatment, in which case the hospital involved would be required
to create such a program.
71
This list is not intended to be exhaustive.
72
This assumes that the defendant waives his or her privacy rights to allow defense
counsel to provide proof to the court of the defendant’s participation and progress in the
Less Restrictive Order (LRO) program.
73
An LRO means that the civil commitment court has ordered that the subject receive
outpatient treatment in the community. A More Restrictive Order (MRO) means that the
civil commitment court has ordered that the subject receive inpatient treatment at Eastern
State or Western State.
74
This list is not intended to be exhaustive.
75
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iv) (2006). See infra notes 93-113 and
accompanying text.
76
Defined in § 10.77.010(17).
77
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii).
78
See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
79
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C)(I) (emphasis added).
80
§ 10.77.060(1)(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
81
The final version of the Bill as passed deleted the time limitation on in-jail
evaluations. Prior versions of the legislation contained an express fifteen day limit on injail evaluations as well. Compare S.B. 5216, 58th Leg. §2(1)(a), Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2003) with S.B. 5216, 58th Leg. §1, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004).
82
Weiss v. Thompson, 85 P.3d 944 (Wash. 2004).
83
See also Competency Examinations Act of 2004, supra note 13 at §1. The statement
of legislative intent expressly distinguishes between competency evaluations in a jail
from competency evaluations in a mental health facility.
84
Weiss, supra note 82, at 947–48.
85
Weiss v. Thompson, 103 P.3d 202 (Wash. 2004) (Table).
86
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C), (iii)(B) (2006).
87
See § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C)(II) (2006).
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88

Although the author is not aware of any outpatient competency-rendering programs,
Western State has advised the author that it would make such treatment available if
ordered. In that regard, staff have indicated to the author that Western State’s
competency evaluator will recommend outpatient competency-rendering treatment if the
competency evaluator deems it appropriate.
89
See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
90
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C)(III) (2006).
91
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
92
See infra notes 129-82 and accompanying text.
93
Although § 10.77.090(1)(d) and (e) do not specify whether dismissal of a nonfelony
should be with or without prejudice, § 10.77.090(4) provides that dismissal of a felony is
without prejudice. There is no logical reason to dismiss a felony without prejudice while
allowing the dismissal of a nonfelony with prejudice, especially in light of the fact that
the legislature amended WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77 in 1998 to treat competency and
insanity issues in felony and nonfelony cases more similarly.
94
See § 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii)-(iv).
95
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B).
96
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B).
97
The phrase “the end of the last day” implies that the deadline would be midnight on
Thursday, which is the actual end of the day, rather than five o’clock, which would be the
end of the business day.
98
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(iv).
99
This cost-allocation issue is something that should be handled on a larger scale that
considers all of the other issues. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
100
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.250 (2006) with WASH. REV. CODE §
71.05.100–.130 (2006).
101
Every county must have a DMHP, who initiates the civil commitment process under
section 71.05 of the Revised Code of Washington when the statutory requirements are
met. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(10) (2006). Prior to July 1, 2005, the statutory
phrase was “County Designated Mental Health Professional,” or CDMHP. The
legislature changed the phrase to reflect that the mental health professional could be
designated by either a county or any other “authority authorized in rule.” §
71.05.020(10) (2006). In some counties, such as King County, the DMHP is actually a
group of mental health professionals who are employed directly by the county. In other
counties, the DMHP is a mental health professional (or group of them) providing services
to the county on a contract basis.
102
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090 (1)(d)(iii)(A); § 71.05.235(1) (2006).
103
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii), (iv).
104
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B).
105
§ 10.77.090 (1)(d)(iii)(A).
106
There is a difference between being on “conditional release” and being out of
custody. A “conditional release” means a modification of a court-ordered commitment.
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(3). “Commitment” is a court-ordered detention for
evaluation or treatment, whether inpatient or outpatient. § 10.77.010(2). Thus, a
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defendant may under some circumstances be out of custody without being on a
conditional release, such as a release on personal recognizance.
107
See § 10.77.090 (1)(d)(iii)(A); § 71.05.235(1).
108
See Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(b). A Personal Restraint Petition is a petition for relief
from an unlawful restraint. Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(a). A person is under a restraint if he
or she “has limited freedom because of a court decision in a civil or criminal proceeding,
[he or she] is confined, [he or she] is subject to imminent confinement, or [he or she] is
under some other disability resulting from a judgment or sentence in a criminal case.”
Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(b).
109
See § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B); § 71.05.235(2).
110
See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(3)(f) (2006).
111
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065(1)(b)(iii)(B) (2006). See infra notes 183–88 and
accompanying text.
112
See § 10.77.090(1)(e). See also infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
113
There is support for this interpretation in the first sentence of WASH. REV. CODE §
10.77.090(1)(e), which applies to a defendant charged with a crime that is not a felony
and “does not meet the criteria under [§ 10.77.090(1)(d)].” Given the context of the
language, the reference to treatment-eligible was probably intended to mean specifically
the treatment-eligible criteria under § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i). But the language quoted above
at least supports an interpretation that § 10.77.090(1)(e) applies to any case that does not
fit within any provision of § 10.77.090(1)(d). Because an incompetent treatment-eligible
nonfelony defendant who is unlikely to regain competency does not fit within the criteria
of § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii), one could make the argument that § 10.77.090(1)(e) applies by
default.
114
This period excludes weekends and holidays. § 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(B); §
71.05.235(2).
115
§ 10.77.090 (1)(d)(iii)(A); § 71.05.235(1).
116
See § 10.77.090(1)(e).
117
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
118
These examples presume that Defendants A, B, and C are not developmentally
disabled; there are some differences in how the competency treatment can be ordered in
the case of a developmentally disabled felony defendant. The examples do not consider
the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065 (2006), which requires the court to
order the DMHP to evaluate a defendant for civil commitment if the competency
evaluation contains the opinion that the defendant should be referred for a civil
commitment evaluation. See infra notes 183–88 and accompanying text.
119
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(b) (2006).
120
§ 10.77.090(3).
121
The court can extend the involuntary treatment another six months if the defendant is
a substantial danger to other persons or presents a substantial likelihood of committing
criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security, and there is a substantial probability
that the defendant will regain competency within a reasonable period of time. §
10.77.090(4). See also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.

PRISON AND DETENTION

Washington's Criminal Competency Laws 275

122

See § 10.77.090(3), (4). The option of releasing the defendant is subject to any
applicable requirements in § 10.77.065(1)(b). See infra notes 183–88 and accompanying
text.
123
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(e) (2006).
124
See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
125
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii).
126
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C). See also supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
127
§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C).
128
See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
129
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, NAT’L. INST. OF HEALTH,
SCHIZOPHRENIA, NIH PUBLICATION NO. 06-3517 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, NATI’L INST. OF HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER, NIH PUBLICATION
NO. 02-3679 (2006).
130
See id.
131
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
132
Id. at 170.
133
Id. at 171.
134
Id. at 175.
135
Id. at 169.
136
Id. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, first analyzed the issue of whether the
Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Court found that the District
Court’s pretrial order was an appealable “collateral order” within the exceptions to the
so-called “final judgment” rule. Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia focused entirely
on the jurisdictional issue. See Id.
137
Id. at 186.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 168.
140
Id. at 174.
141
See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (discussing of subsequent cases
attempting to define a “serious” crime for purposes of involuntary medication).
142
See id.
143
United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237-38 (4th Cir. 2005).
144
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
145
WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 21-22; State v. Browet, Inc., 691 P.2d 691 (Ariz. 1984);
Pasco v. Mace, 653 P.2d 618 (Wash. 1982).
146
Evans, 404 F.3d at 237 (citations omitted).
147
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.092 (2006).
148
§ 10.77.092(1). Interestingly, prior drafts of the enacting legislation gave city and
county legislatures the authority to declare additional categories of crimes as serious per
se on the basis of standards similar to those applicable to the courts. See S.B. 6274, 58th
Leg. §3, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004) (proposed subsection 3). That authority did not survive
in the final version of the bill as enacted. See Competency Restoration Act, 2004 Wash.
Sess. Laws page no. 555, ch. 157 (amending WASH REV. CODE §§ 10.77, 71.05).
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149

§ 10.77.092(2). One interesting question is whether this delegation to the courts by
the legislature flies in the face of the Evans court’s desire to respect legislative
prerogative.
150
See S.B. 6274, supra note 148.
151
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-80 (2003).
152
United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1128 (2005).
153
State v. Hernandez, 119 P.3d 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
154
Id. (using phrase “clear, cogent, and convincing”). The phrases “clear, cogent, and
convincing” and “clear and convincing” are used interchangeablely. For example, the
supreme court has held that the equivalent standard of clear and convincing evidence
applies whether a nonfelony defendant is in the treatment-eligible or non-treatmenteligible category. See Born v. Thompson, 117 P.3d 1098 (Wash. 2003).
155
There is one Ninth Circuit case that came close to addressing the issue. In United
States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2004), a federal magistrate judge
found that the government had provided clear and convincing evidence that all the factors
for involuntary medication to restore competency had been met. The Ninth Circuit held
that federal magistrate judges were not authorized to decide whether to authorize
involuntary medication for competency-rendering treatment, and the court remanded the
case so that the district court could review the magistrate judge’s findings de novo. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit did not actually reach the issue of what the burden of proof is for
involuntary medication.
156
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-80 (2003).
157
Id. In State v. Adams, 888 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) and State v.
Lover, 707 P.2d 1351, 1353-54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985), the Court of Appeals held that the
state can have a compelling interest in trying a defendant criminally. The charges in
those two cases were felonies. After Sell, it appears that the trial court still must make an
independent inquiry into the nature of the charges and circumstances in order to make a
finding that the government has an important interest at stake in trying a particular
defendant.
158
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
159
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (2006).
160
There are some misdemeanors that carry a maximum jail sentence of less than ninety
days. See, e.g., SEATTLE MUN. CODE, § 22.206.290(B) (2001) (thirty-day maximum).
161
See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150(1)(b) (2006) (Superior Court has jurisdiction over
petition); § 71.05.130 (County Prosecutor or Attorney General’s Office represent
petitioning agencies).
162
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.390 (2006).
163
Competency Restoration Act of 2004, supra note 148, at §§ 4-5.
164
§ 71.05.390(6)(b).
165
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.093 (2006). This may pose some interesting issues if
defense counsel’s knowledge is deemed to be either a client confidence or a client secret
on the basis of RPC 1.6. See State v. Webbe, 94 P.3d 994 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). In
Webbe, one of the defense attorneys sought to testify at a jury trial on the issue of the
defendant’s competency. The attorney’s statement of his intent to testify about his
impressions of the defendant’s competency led to the trial court finding a waiver of the
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attorney-client privilege. The attorney later decided not to testify, and prosecutors
returned their unredacted copy of the defense attorney’s interview notes to the defendant.
After a hung jury in the first competency trial, a second jury found the defendant
competent. The defendant was subsequently convicted of multiple counts of murder and
burglary. Division One upheld the trial court’s finding that the defense attorney had
waived the attorney-client privilege, even though it was made without the defendant’s
consent.
Division One also affirmed the convictions, finding that under the
circumstances the “grievous error” did not result in a breakdown in the adversarial
process such that prejudice should be presumed. Since the defendant did not allege any
prejudice, Division One declined to find any either.
166
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (emphasis added).
167
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)(C) (2006).
168
See § 10.77.090(1)(b)(3), (4).
169
The issue of mitigating side effects is one that is also susceptible to vigorous
litigation. It would not be surprising to see an increase in the number of defense experts
appointed pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.070 (2006), specifically on this issue.
170
See, e.g., United States v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317, 319-20 (8th Cir. 2004) (5-10 percent
chance not “substantially likely”); United State v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 161-62 (Conn.
2004) (70 percent chance is “substantially likely”); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d
873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001) (pre-Sell case holding 70
percent chance is “likely” to restore); United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741
(E.D. LA 2005) (70 percent chance or higher is “substantially likely”).
171
See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
172
Washington v. Hernandez-Ramirez, 119 P.3d 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
173
See, e.g., Evans, 404 F.3d at 240-41; Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
174
See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113-16 (10th Cir. 2005); Gomes,
387 F.3d at 161-62.
175
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
176
Id.
177
See also supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
178
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181-82 (2003).
179
The author has handled a case involving similar facts.
180
See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
181
Sell, 539 U.S. at 178, 181.
182
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.030 (2006).
183
The evaluation must include:
An opinion as to whether the defendant should be evaluated by a [DMHP] under
chapter 71.05 RCW, and an opinion as to whether the defendant is a substantial
danger to other persons, or presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal
acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless kept under further control by the
court or other persons or institutions.
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(3)(f) (2006).
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184

This process is codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065, (2006).
The language of section 10.77.065(1)(b) includes a referral prior to a defendant’s
release from confinement if he or she is convicted and sentenced to less than twenty-four
months. A defendant may not proceed to trial, plead guilty, or be sentenced while
incompetent. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.050 (2006).
186
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
187
For example, the referral must be made prior to the defendant’s release from custody
if the defendant is convicted and sentenced to twenty-four months or less of confinement.
§ 10.77.065(1)(b). But the statute is silent about what happens if the defendant is
convicted but not sentenced to jail time. For defendants who are not convicted, the
referral must be made prior to charges being dismissed or the defendant being acquitted.
Id. But there is no way for the court to know in advance that one of those events will
happen and therefore no way to make the referral in advance.
188
See infra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
189
This assumes either a guilty finding, a guilty verdict, or some other resolution of the
case involving a court-monitored sanction. If the defendant is acquitted, or the case is
dismissed, the case is at the post-judgment stage but competency issues are no longer
implicated.
190
See WASH. R. APP. P. 1.1(a); Karl B. Tegland, 2A Rules Practice, 44-45 (6th ed.
2004).
191
Tegland, supra note 190, at 82.
192
Karl B. Tegland, 4B Rules Practice, 189 (6th ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
193
WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 7.3 (felonies); WASH. CT. CRIM. R. LTD. JURIS. 7.3
(nonfelonies).
194
WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 7.4(b) (felonies); WASH. CT. CRIM. R. LTD. JURIS. 7.4(b)
(nonfelonies).
195
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.090(1) (2006).
196
§ 10.77.050.
197
See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.505,
9.94A.634 (2006) (imposition of sentence and probation; no provision for deferral of
sentence).
198
See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.330 (2006) (applicable to municipal courts for cities
with population less than 400,000); WASH. REV. CODE § 3.66.068 (2006) (applicable to
district courts); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.20.255(1) (2006) (applicable to municipal courts
for cities with population in excess of 400,000, i.e., Seattle Municipal Court).
199
The court could impose a straight sentence, such as a specific fine or specific amount
of incarceration without any probation conditions. There are no post-judgment
competency issues with a straight sentence because a straight sentence does not contain
any probation conditions and therefore cannot be the subject of a probation revocation
hearing.
200
WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 7.3 (felonies); WASH. CT. CRIM. R. LTD. JURIS. 7.3
(nonfelonies).
201
See § 3.50.330 (municipal courts for cities with population less than 400,000); §
3.66.068 (district courts); § 35.20.255(1) (municipal courts for cities with population in
excess of 400,000, i.e., Seattle Municipal Court).
185
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202

It should be noted that a dismissal following successful completion of a deferred
sentence is still considered a “conviction record” for purposes of the Criminal Records
Privacy Act. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(3)-(4) (2006).
203
State v. Proctor, 415 P.2d 634, 646 (Wash. 1966).
204
Sometimes referred to as stipulated orders of continuance or continuances for
dismissal.
205
Indeed, a petition for deferred prosecution must acknowledge the sufficiency of the
police report to support a finding of guilt. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.05.020(4) (2006).
206
See King County Bar Association—Young Lawyers Division, Washington Lawyers
Practice Manual, ch. XVII, Pt. 2, sec. V.D.4 (2004).
207
§ 10.05.020(1).
208
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.05.120 (2006).
209
§ 10.05.020(3); § 10.05.090. If the noncompliance is based on a conviction for “a
similar offense,” the court “shall” revoke the deferred prosecution. § 10.05.100.
210
State ex rel. Schillberg v. Cascade Dist. Court, 621 P.2d 115, 120 (Wash. 1980).
211
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(1)(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Even if that section
did not apply to a post-conviction matter, superior courts in Washington likely have
inherent judicial powers to make determinations regarding competency to stand trial. See
State v. Wicklund, 638 P.2d 1241 (Wash. 1982) (noting that courts relied exclusively on
that inherent power prior to the adoption of § 10.77). Whether that inherent authority
extends to district or municipal courts is best left for the parties to brief in a particular
case.
212
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.050 (2006) (emphasis added).
213
State v. Campbell, 632 P.2d 517 (Wash. 1981) (felony probation). See also Spokane
v. Marquette, 43 P.3d 502 (Wash. 2002) (applying Campbell in context of tolling
nonfelony probation).
214
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)-(4) (2006). See State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60
(Wash. 1990) (felony case).
215
See Wicklund, 638 P.2d at 1242 (including cases cited therein).
216
Campbell, 632 P.2d at 519
217
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)-(4) (2006). See also supra notes 44-51, 93-128
and accompanying text.
218
See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
219
WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 7.3 (felonies); WASH. CT. CRIM. R. LTD. JURIS. 7.3
(nonfelonies).
220
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.050 (2006).
221
See notes 44-51, 93-102, 116-17.
222
See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
223
See Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.94A (2006) (felonies);
§ 3.50.320 (2006), § 3.50.330 (municipal courts for cities with population of under
400,000); §§ 3.66.067–.068 (district courts); § 35.20.255 (municipal courts for cities with
population in excess of 400,000).
224
If the defendant was competent to proceed on the new charge, he or she would
undoubtedly be competent to proceed with sentencing on the old charge. If the defendant
was incompetent to proceed, but was eligible for competency-rendering treatment on the
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new charge, it is possible he or she could be rendered competent on both the sentencing
matter and the new charge.
225
See generally State v. Marshall, 27 P.3d 192 (Wash. 2001).
226
Id. at 193-94.
227
Id. at 194-95.
228
Id. at 199 (citing In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610 (Wash. 2001)).
229
Id. at 200.
230
See, e.g., United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987) (meaningful
retrospective competency hearing requires quantity and quality of available evidence
such that competency assessment is more than mere speculation).
231
Id.
232
State v. Campbell, 632 P.2d 517 (1981).
233
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92 (2006), which has since been supplanted by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981; § 9.94A.
234
Campbell, 632 P.2d at 518.
235
Id.
236
Spokane v. Marquette, 43 P.3d 502 (Wash. 2002).
237
Id. at 505 - 506.
238
Id. at 505.
239
See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.350.320 (2006); § 3.350.330 (municipal courts for cities
with population of 400,000 and under); §§ 3.66.067-.068 (district courts); § 35.20.255
(municipal courts for cities with population in excess of 400,000).
240
See WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 3.3(c)(2)(ii); WASH. CRIM. LTD. JURIS. 3.3(c)(2)(ii).
241
See WASH. CT. CRIM. R. 3.3(e)(1) (applicable to felonies); WASH. CRIM. LTD. JURIS.
3.3 (e)(1) (nonfelonies).
242
WASH. CT. CRIM R. 3.3(E)(1).
243
Id.
244
See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
245
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.05.020(4) (2006).
246
§ 10.05.110.
247
State v. Campbell, 632 P.2d 517, 518 (Wash. 1981).
248
See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
249
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.05.140 (2006).
250
But if the court cannot revoke probation, and if the defendant nevertheless remains
on probation, what happens to the duties and responsibilities of the probation officer?
Case law has expanded the liability of probation officers when their probationers commit
tortious acts. See, e.g., Hertog v. City of Seattle, 979 P.2d 400 (Wash. 1999). Absent
statutory guidance, probation officers face potential liability for negligent supervision
even though they have no ability to bring about sanctions for noncompliance.
251
Obviously, if the court finds the defendant competent, or if the court orders
competency-rendering treatment and the treatment restores the defendant to competency,
the court will not need to deal immediately with the issue of referring the defendant for a
civil commitment evaluation.
252
“The court shall order an evaluation . . . (i) Prior to release from confinement for
such person who is convicted, if sentenced to confinement for twenty-four months or
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less; (ii) for any person who is acquitted; or (iii) for any person whose [felony] charges
are dismissed pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(4) or (B) (2006) whose
nonfelony charges are dismissed.” § 10.77.065(1)(b). See supra notes 183–88 and
accompanying text for further detail. None of these three conditions relate to a person
awaiting sentencing or a probation violation hearing.
253
See § 10.77.090(1)(d), (1)(e). Although § 10.77.090(4) contemplates initiating civil
commitment proceedings against an incompetent felony defendant, it does not expressly
authorize the court to detain the defendant for that purpose.
254
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05 with § 10.77.090(1)(d)-(e) (2006).
255
In the Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons Act of 1998, which amended both the
competency and civil commitment laws, the legislature took care to recognize that
incompetence to stand criminal trial did not equate to eligibility for civil commitment.
Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons Act of 1998, supra note 4, at §1 (statement of
legislative intent).
256
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(14) (2006). See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch.
10.77.
257
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(22) (2006). See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch.
71.05.
258
State v. Klein, 124 P.3d 644, 650 (Wash. 2005). The court noted that, according to
the dictionary, “mental disease or defect” has the common meaning of “mental disorder”
(citing Webster’s third new International Dictionary 1411 (2002)). What is extraordinary
is that the opinion ignores the statutory definition of “mental disorder” contained in §
71.05.020(22).
259
A “mental disorder” is defined as “any organic, mental, or emotional impairment
which has substantial adverse effects on an individual’s cognitive or volitional
functions.” § 71.05.020(22).
260
See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
261
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
262
See supra notes 42-182 and accompanying text.
263
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(3) (2006) with Laws 1974, Ex. Sess, ch.
198, § 6; Laws 1989, ch. 420, § 4; Laws 1998, ch. 297, § 34; and Laws 2000, ch. 74, § 1.
Pursuant to § 10.77.060(3), a competency report must include:
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;
(b) A diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant;
(c) If the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect, or is developmentally
disabled, an opinion as to competency;
(d) If the defendant has indicated his or her intention to rely on the defense of
insanity pursuant to RCW 10.77.030, an opinion as to the defendant’s sanity at the
time of the act;
(e) When directed by the court, an opinion as to the capacity of the defendant to have
a particular state of mind which is an element of the offense charged;
(f) An opinion as to whether the defendant should be evaluated by a designated
mental health professional under chapter 71.05 RCW, and an opinion as to whether
the defendant is a substantial danger to other persons, or presents a substantial
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likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless
kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions.
§ 10.77.060(3).
264

§ 10.77.060(3)(f).
The statute defines the “substantial danger” assessment as “whether the defendant is
a substantial danger to other persons, or presents a substantial likelihood of committing
criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless kept under further control by
the court or other persons or institutions.” § 10.77.060(3)(f).
266
See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(4). See also supra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text.
267
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065 (2006). See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying
text. One would logically assume that the mandatory referral is triggered by the opinion
as to whether the defendant should be evaluated for civil commitment, yet § 10.77.065
speaks in general terms about the opinion “under RCW 10.77.060(3)(f)” that the
defendant “should be kept under further control.”
268
In felony cases, competency evaluations can occur at three different stages. There is
the initial evaluation (§ 10.77.060(1)(a)), the evaluation at the end of the first 90-day
competency-rendering treatment period, and the evaluation at the end of the second 90day treatment period. See § 10.77.060(1); § 10.77.090(2)-(4). Under current law, each
evaluation is required to contain a dangerousness assessment.
269
See infra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
270
An assessment of a defendant’s future dangerousness or future criminal behavior is
far more involved than an assessment of a defendant’s suitability for civil commitment
evaluation. Compare Polly Phipps & Gregg J. Gagliardi, WASH. STATE INSTITUTE FOR
PUBLIC POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION OF WASHINGTON’S DANGEROUS MENTALLY ILL
OFFENDER LAW: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS app. C (assessment for potential civil
commitment) with app. A (risk assessment for future dangerousness/criminal behavior)
(2002). See also Martin Grann, Henrik Belfrage, & Anders Tengstrom, Actuarial
Assessment of Risk for Violence: Predictive Validity of the VRAG and the Historical Part
of the HCR-20, 27 Criminal Justice & Behavior 97 (2000).
271
See infra notes 278-91 and accompanying text.
272
Without the civil commitment opinion, judges could not easily determine which
defendants should be referred for civil commitment evaluation. The result is that courts
will most likely err on the side of caution by referring defendants for civil commitment
evaluation. Since those referrals would for the most part be made to the local DMHP
rather than Eastern or Western State (see §§ 10.77.090(1)(d)(iii)(A), (1)(e); WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.05.130), the DMHP would soon find itself inundated with inappropriate
referrals, depleting already scarce resources.
273
§ 10.77.060(1)(a) (2006). In 2005, the legislature amended the statute to expressly
authorize the parties to agree to waive the requirement of two competency examiners or
to agree that the evaluation should occur in the jail. See Competency Examinations Act
of 2004, supra note 13, at § 1(9).
265
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274

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.070 (2006). If the defendant is indigent, the state pays for
the expert. Id. See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-875-0030 (2006).
275
See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
276
§ 10.77.060(3)(d), (e) (2006).
277
Redick, supra note 33.
278
See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
279
See supra notes 129-79 and accompanying text.
280
See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(d)(ii) (2006).
281
See State v. Adams, 888 P.2d 1207-08 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Lover, 707
P.2d 1351, 1352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
282
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.092 (2006) defines serious offenses for purposes of the
involuntary medication and competency-rendering processes.
283
See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
284
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
285
See supra notes 50-51, 93-117 and accompanying text.
286
See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.065 (2006). See also supra notes 183–88 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion.
287
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(e) (2006).
288
See § 71.05.150; § 71.05.280.
289
See § 10.77.090(4).
290
See § 10.77.090(1)(d), (e). See also supra notes 93-128 and accompanying text for a
more detailed discussion.
291
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. The statute in effect at the time made
the referral discretionary. See former WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(1)(e) (1999).
292
For this purpose, “post-judgment” includes dispositional continuances, deferred
prosecutions, and other similar dispositions short of trial. See supra notes 204-10 and
accompanying text.
293
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
294
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.040 (2006); § 10.77.080; 10.77.110.
295
See § 10.77.160–.190.
296
§ 10.77.025(1). The length of treatment under a competency process must bear a
reasonable relationship to the purpose of the treatment. Jackson, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
297
See Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons Act of 1998, supra note 4, at §1.
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